Reyes Briseda v. Bardini

Background

Juan Reyes Briseda and Maria de los Angeles Zamudio Gonzalez filed asylum applications in November 2020. They alleged that they requested asylum-interview scheduling in December 2021 and September 2022, but that no interview had been scheduled. They sued Emilia M. Bardini, Alejandro Mayorkas, and Merrick Garland, seeking an order requiring the government to issue an interview-scheduling notice. The opinion states that Danielle Lehman was substituted for Emilia Bardini as Director of the San Francisco Asylum Office.

The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Mandamus Act, and the statute authorizing declaratory judgments. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the undisputed evidence requires judgment for one side without a trial.

Mandamus Act claim

The court held that the plaintiffs could not obtain mandamus relief. Mandamus is an extraordinary court order requiring a government official to perform a clearly defined duty when no adequate alternative remedy exists. The court relied on the asylum statute’s provision stating that its timing requirements do not create a legally enforceable right or benefit against the United States, its agencies, or officers. The plaintiffs did not dispute that point or identify another basis for mandamus relief. The court therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Mandamus Act claim.

Subject-matter jurisdiction

The defendants argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ APA claims. The court rejected that argument. It found that the plaintiffs were not trying to enforce the asylum statute’s 45-day interview-scheduling period. Instead, they alleged that the delay was unreasonable under the APA. The court concluded that the APA permits review of an agency’s unreasonable delay and that it had jurisdiction to review these claims.

APA claim

The court evaluated the alleged delay using six factors commonly called the TRAC factors. They consider whether the agency follows a reasonable decision-making approach, whether Congress provided a timetable, the effect on health and welfare, the effect of granting priority over competing agency work, the interests harmed by delay, and whether the agency acted improperly.

The court found that the factors favored the defendants. It held that the government’s Last-In-First-Out, or LIFO, policy was governed by a reasonable rationale: reducing the asylum backlog and discouraging non-meritorious applications filed to obtain work authorization. Although Congress had indicated that interviews generally should be scheduled within 45 days, the court found that the timing provision was not mandatory and did not outweigh the rationale supporting the agency’s policy. The court also found that the more than three-year delay was not unreasonable under the factors.

The court acknowledged the plaintiffs’ concerns about waiting for their interviews but found that they had provided no evidence supporting the alleged harm. The opinion states that Maria de los Angeles Zamudio Gonzalez remained authorized to work and that both plaintiffs could remain in the United States without fear of removal while their asylum applications were pending. The court also found that moving the plaintiffs ahead of other asylum applicants would merely shift the delay to those applicants. The plaintiffs conceded that they did not know of any agency impropriety, and the court found the impropriety factor neutral.

Based on this analysis, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the APA claims. Because the defendants prevailed on the APA and Mandamus Act claims, the court also found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to declaratory relief.

Evidentiary objections and disposition

The plaintiffs objected to ten defense exhibits on grounds including hearsay, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, speculation, and unfair prejudice. The court overruled these blanket objections. It explained that, at the summary-judgment stage, the focus is on whether the contents of evidence could be admissible, not necessarily whether the evidence is presented in trial-ready form. The court added that it would have granted summary judgment even without considering the challenged exhibits because the order did not rely on them.

The court’s final disposition was to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and overrule the plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections.