Christianson v. Markquart

Background

Erik Christianson brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Jeffrey Markquart, identified as the Martin County Sheriff acting in his official capacity. Christianson alleged that Markquart assessed pay-for-stay costs against him without determining whether he qualified for a waiver under Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b). Christianson also asserted due-process claims under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

In an earlier order, the court entered summary judgment for Christianson on the state-law claim. It declared that Markquart violated Minn. Stat. § 641.12, subd. 3(b), by failing to determine whether Christianson qualified for a waiver, and it enjoined Markquart from collecting or attempting to collect the resulting debts until Martin County created compliant procedures. The court did not decide the constitutional issues.

Prevailing-party analysis

Christianson requested $17,300 in attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court held that he was a prevailing plaintiff entitled to reasonable fees. A prevailing plaintiff is one who succeeds on a significant issue and obtains some benefit sought in the litigation.

The court explained that fees may be awarded when a plaintiff receives relief on a state-law claim that avoids a constitutional question, if the constitutional claim was substantial and both claims arose from the same facts. The court found that Christianson’s due-process claim was substantial because it was not frivolous and because the court had jurisdiction over it. The court also found that the due-process and state-law claims arose from the same facts: Markquart’s failure to establish procedures for determining eligibility for a pay-for-stay waiver.

The court rejected Markquart’s argument that he had partially prevailed. It clarified that its earlier ruling did not hold that Markquart’s existing policies complied with the statute. Rather, the court held that Markquart had no procedures and was required to create procedures for assessing waiver eligibility. The court also clarified that it had not decided whether the Constitution required a pre-assessment procedure; it had only decided that the statute did not specify whether the procedure had to occur before or after assessment.

Fee calculation

The court used the lodestar method, which calculates a reasonable fee by multiplying reasonably expended hours by a reasonable hourly rate. Christianson sought fees for Bradford Colbert and Brandt Devich.

For Colbert, the court found that a $450 hourly rate and an estimated 27 hours were reasonable. But Colbert acknowledged that he had not kept contemporaneous time records and had estimated his hours by reviewing the case file. The court therefore reduced the claimed hours by 50% and awarded $6,075 for Colbert’s work.

The court denied fees for Devich’s work. Devich had been a student attorney and continued working on the case after graduating. The supervising attorney had not filed the required student-practice certification; Devich appeared at three hearings without the supervising attorney’s appearance being recorded; and, after graduation, Devich continued working without filing a notice of appearance or being admitted to the District of Minnesota’s bar. The court also noted that Devich had not kept contemporaneous time records.

Disposition

The court GRANTED in part and DENIED in part Christianson’s motion for attorney fees. It awarded $6,075 for Colbert’s work and DENIED Christianson’s request for fees for Devich’s work. The court ordered judgment entered accordingly.