Wilansky v. United States of America

Background

Sophia Wilansky was seriously injured when an object exploded while she was protesting construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline in North Dakota on November 21, 2016. After surgery at Hennepin County Medical Center, doctors sent a piece of shrapnel removed from her arm to the hospital’s pathology department. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents later obtained Wilansky’s clothing through a written agreement with her father and obtained the shrapnel through a grand jury subpoena.

The United States kept the clothing and shrapnel during its investigation. No criminal charges had been filed in connection with Wilansky’s injuries when she brought this case. Her complaint asserted three claims: a request under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for return of the property; a Fifth Amendment due-process claim; and a Fourth Amendment claim alleging that the continued retention was unreasonable. Morton County, North Dakota intervened for the limited purpose of having any rights concerning the property decided in the case.

Analysis

The respondents moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. Because no criminal charges had been filed, the court treated the Rule 41(g) request as an equitable claim for return of property rather than as an ordinary criminal-procedure motion. To exercise that equitable jurisdiction, Wilansky had to establish that the United States acted with callous disregard of her Fourth Amendment rights, that she would suffer irreparable harm without relief, and that she lacked an adequate legal remedy. The court could also consider her individual interest in and need for the property.

The court found that Wilansky did not establish callous disregard. Her father had consented to the initial seizure of the clothing, and the United States obtained the shrapnel through a grand jury subpoena. The United States also provided an ex parte declaration describing an ongoing criminal investigation and testing involving the property. The written consent did not limit how long the United States could retain the clothing.

The court also found no irreparable harm. Wilansky had not shown why she could not begin a civil action without first obtaining the property, provided no evidence that the property would deteriorate, and could not establish irreparable harm based on possible reputational damage from future criminal charges. The court further concluded that she had not shown the absence of an adequate legal remedy because possible criminal charges could allow a motion to suppress, and a civil case could provide discovery or other legal mechanisms for access to the property. The court did find that Wilansky had an individual interest in and need for the property because it could help determine the cause of her injury and support efforts to obtain redress.

Because three of the four relevant factors weighed against exercising equitable jurisdiction, the court dismissed Count 1 without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

As to Counts 2 and 3, the court held that sovereign immunity generally bars claims against the United States and federal officials sued in their official capacities unless Congress has clearly waived that immunity. Wilansky’s complaint did not allege or establish such a waiver or otherwise establish subject-matter jurisdiction. The court dismissed both constitutional claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Disposition

Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright denied Wilansky’s motion for the return of seized property. The court granted the respondents’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Wilansky’s complaint without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.