Fredin v. Middlecamp

Background

Brock Fredin, proceeding without a lawyer, brought claims against Lindsey Middlecamp for defamation per se, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Fredin alleged that Middlecamp posted false and disparaging statements about him on the Twitter account @CardsAgsHrsmt, including sharing a post by an unnamed woman accusing him of rape. He also alleged that Middlecamp called him dangerous and a stalker and posted his online dating profiles with warnings.

Fredin alleged that he identified Middlecamp as the account operator on Facebook. Middlecamp then obtained a harassment restraining order against Fredin in Ramsey County District Court. After two evidentiary hearings, the state court issued a two-year restraining order, finding reasonable grounds to believe that Fredin had followed, pursued, or stalked Middlecamp and had frightened her with threatening behavior.

Motions and objections

Middlecamp moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim, to dismiss Count II for abuse of process and Count III for intentional infliction of emotional distress. She also moved to strike portions of the amended complaint as harassing and inflammatory.

The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion to dismiss Count II and denying it as to Count III. The magistrate judge also granted in part the motion to strike, removing personal information deemed irrelevant, but declined to strike language as overly inflammatory.

Fredin objected to dismissal of Count II. In his objections, he attempted to add allegations that Middlecamp used the harassment-order proceedings for extortion and conspired with the state-court judicial officer. The court treated his filings liberally because he was representing himself but concluded that he had not properly moved to amend his amended complaint. The court further determined that amendment would be futile because the added allegations still would not state a claim.

Court’s analysis

Under Minnesota law, abuse of process requires an ulterior purpose and use of legal process to obtain a result outside the scope of the proceeding. The court held that Fredin did not allege sufficient facts showing that Middlecamp used the harassment-order process for a result outside its scope. The court explained that protecting privacy is an express purpose of Minnesota’s harassment-order statute. It therefore concluded that the alleged purposes of protecting Middlecamp’s privacy and anonymity were within the scope of that proceeding and could not support an abuse-of-process claim.

The court also rejected Fredin’s proposed extortion theory. It found that he offered only a conclusory allegation and an alleged settlement agreement that could not be used for the asserted purpose under Federal Rule of Evidence 408. The court stated that, even if amendment were permitted, the abuse-of-process claim would still fail to state a claim.

The court declined to dismiss the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court had to accept the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draw reasonable inferences for Fredin. It adopted the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the allegations, including the alleged conduct and claimed severe mental anguish, were sufficient at that stage.

The court also addressed Fredin’s attempt to challenge the state harassment-order proceedings and assert a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prevents federal district courts from acting as appeals courts to review state-court judgments. The court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the state court’s decision and stated that review of the harassment-order proceedings would have to be pursued through Minnesota’s appellate courts.

Disposition

The court overruled Fredin’s objections and adopted the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation and Order in its entirety. It granted in part and denied in part Middlecamp’s motion to dismiss Counts II and III: dismissal of Count II for abuse of process was granted, while dismissal of Count III for intentional infliction of emotional distress was denied. The court also adopted the magistrate judge’s ruling granting in part and denying in part Middlecamp’s motion to strike.