Fredin v. Miller

Background

Brock Fredin filed a complaint against Grace Elizabeth Miller, Catherine Schaefer, Lindsey Middlecamp, David Middlecamp, Peter Mayer, David Green, and Dorsey and Whitney. Fredin represented himself. He alleged that the defendants participated in conduct he described as a scheme involving threats, criminal proceedings, confinement, and other mistreatment.

His claims arose primarily from four groups of events: his 2018 state conviction for stalking by mail and violating a harassment restraining order; communications involving Middlecamp and possible criminal charges; alleged efforts by Schaefer and the Dorsey Defendants to pursue criminal charges through city attorney offices in connection with a civil case; and Miller’s alleged police reports concerning internet posts. The complaint asserted 21 claims, including malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, four abuse-of-process claims, assault and battery, three negligence claims, fraud, invasion of privacy, three intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, two negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, false arrest, and civil conspiracy.

Miller’s Motion to Join

Miller asked for permission to join the other Non-Dorsey Defendants’ motion to dismiss after failing to respond to the complaint by the original deadline. Fredin did not oppose that request. The court granted Miller’s motion to join, finding that no default judgment had been entered, Miller had shown good cause, and allowing her to join would not prejudice Fredin.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true and viewed reasonable inferences in Fredin’s favor, but it did not accept conclusory allegations or unsupported legal conclusions. The complaint had to contain enough factual matter to make liability plausible, rather than merely possible. The court also considered public records and documents embraced by the complaint.

Malicious Prosecution

The court dismissed all three malicious-prosecution claims. Under Minnesota law, the claim requires an action brought without probable cause, malicious intent, and termination of the action in the plaintiff’s favor.

For Count 1, the court held that the private defendants and the law firm could not commence a criminal prosecution. It also held that the criminal matter did not terminate in Fredin’s favor because, although his stalking-by-mail conviction was later vacated after the statute was declared unconstitutional, his conviction for violating the harassment restraining order remained. The court dismissed Count 1 with prejudice.

For Count 2, the court held that no criminal case had been brought because the potential charges were declined. The court also found that the alleged emails, citations to related cases, and request for custody time did not support a malicious-prosecution claim. It dismissed Count 2 with prejudice.

For Count 3, the court held that Miller, as a private citizen, lacked authority to commence a criminal prosecution or falsely imprison Fredin through a sentence. Fredin also alleged that no charges resulted from Miller’s police reports, so there was no criminal prosecution that could have ended in his favor. The court dismissed Count 3 with prejudice.

False Imprisonment and Abuse of Process

The court dismissed Count 4, the false-imprisonment claim, with prejudice. Fredin’s confinement resulted from a state-court sentence, and the court held that the sentence was lawfully executed. The surviving conviction for violating the harassment restraining order independently supported the confinement. The defendants also lacked authority to prosecute Fredin or impose or execute his sentence.

The court dismissed all four abuse-of-process claims—Counts 5, 6, 7.1, and 18—with prejudice. Abuse of process requires an ulterior purpose and use of legal process to obtain a result outside the scope of the proceeding. Counts 5 and 6 concerned alleged denial of law-library access and forced labor while Fredin was jailed; the court held that those allegations described conditions of confinement, not misuse of legal process. The court also held that the emails involving a show-cause motion were not legal process and that Fredin did not plausibly explain how a civil proceeding could constitute a criminal prosecution. For Count 18, the court likewise found no plausible improper use of legal process outside the scope of the proceedings.

Assault and Battery

The court dismissed Count 7.2 with prejudice. Fredin did not plausibly allege that these defendants physically touched him or had the present ability to carry out a threat of bodily harm. The court also held that denial of law-library access did not involve physical contact or a threat of bodily harm.

Negligence and Fraud

The court dismissed Counts 8, 9, and 10, the negligence claims, with prejudice. A negligence claim requires a duty of care, breach, proximate cause, and injury. Fredin did not identify the source of any duty, explain how the defendants breached one, or plausibly allege damages. The court held that the Dorsey Defendants did not owe Fredin a duty of care because they represented the opposing party in a lawsuit. It also held that the defendants’ conduct was not a substantial factor causing Fredin’s jail sentence, which resulted from his conduct and independent decisions by prosecutors, a jury, and a judge.

The court dismissed Count 11, the fraud claim against Miller, with prejudice. Fredin did not allege that Miller made the police reports to induce him to rely on them, that he relied on them, or that he suffered financial damages from reliance. The court found that any intended reliance would have been by the police, not Fredin.

Privacy and Emotional-Distress Claims

The court dismissed Count 12, the invasion-of-privacy claim, with prejudice. Fredin based the claim on his lack of privacy while serving his sentence, but the court held that the sentence was not illegal and that the defendants did not prosecute or imprison him.

The court dismissed Counts 13, 14, and 15, the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, with prejudice. It held that the defendants lacked authority to prosecute or jail Fredin and that the alleged police reports or threats of legal action were not sufficiently extreme and outrageous under the circumstances.

The court dismissed Counts 16 and 17, the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims, with prejudice. Those claims depended on negligence, but Fredin had not adequately alleged a duty or proximate cause. He also could not show that the defendants placed him in the required zone of physical danger.

False Arrest and Civil Conspiracy

The court dismissed Count 19.2, the false-arrest claim, with prejudice. Fredin did not allege that any defendant arrested him or took him into custody, and the alleged law-enforcement arrest was not shown to be unlawful.

The court dismissed Count 19.1, the civil-conspiracy claim, with prejudice. Because Fredin had not plausibly alleged an underlying tort, he could not maintain a conspiracy claim based on those alleged torts.

Disposition

Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted the Dorsey Defendants’ motion to dismiss, granted Miller’s motion for leave to join the Non-Dorsey Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and granted the Non-Dorsey Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the action with prejudice and directed that judgment be entered. The court stated that all claims failed and that amendment would be futile.