Benson v. Harpstead

Background

Michael D. Benson brought constitutional claims against officials of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program in their individual and official capacities. He alleged that he was subjected to two unclothed visual body searches on December 6 and 7, 2016, before being placed in a high-security area. He also alleged that the placements were unnecessary, that he was not given an opportunity to challenge them or review supporting evidence, and that officials interfered with his religious activities by removing him from one Native American ceremony and writing him up for attending two others.

The defendants objected to a magistrate judge’s recommendation that several claims not be dismissed. Benson objected to the recommended dismissal of his substantive due-process claims concerning high-security placement and his First Amendment free-exercise claims. The district court reviewed the objections and record independently as required for objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation.

First Amendment claims

The court dismissed Benson’s First Amendment claims concerning the alleged interference with his religious exercise because the complaint did not plausibly allege that the three incidents substantially burdened his ability to practice or express his religious beliefs. The court declined to consider additional allegations raised in Benson’s briefing because a complaint generally cannot be changed through briefs, although it noted that Benson could seek permission to amend his complaint under the local rules.

The court adopted the recommendation to preserve Benson’s First Amendment retaliation claims against McGowan and Kosloski, including claims concerning Kosloski’s participation in the search of Benson’s room.

Fourth Amendment claims

The court held that Benson plausibly alleged that the two unclothed visual body searches violated the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches. The court explained that whether such searches are reasonable depends on the circumstances, including the scope and manner of the intrusion, the justification for the search, and where it occurred.

The court found that the record did not provide enough information to decide at the motion-to-dismiss stage whether the searches were necessary and reasonable for institutional security. It therefore denied dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claims against Wyatt, Beavens, Shorter, and Fischer based on the December 6 and 7 searches. The court dismissed the remaining Fourth Amendment claims without prejudice.

Fourteenth Amendment procedural-due-process claims

The court held that Benson plausibly alleged that his placements in the high-security area were punishment rather than restrictions reasonably related to a legitimate security objective. He alleged that he was not dangerous or out of control, that the placements were used for convenience, and that he was not given an opportunity to contest them.

Because the record did not establish whether the placements were sufficiently unusual and serious to create a protected liberty interest, the court declined to resolve that issue against Benson at the pleading stage. It denied dismissal of the procedural-due-process claims based on the December 6 and 7 placements against Wyatt, Beavens, Gianinni, Fischer, Johnson, Brindamor, Aldrin, Lind, Goeglein, Korby, Schesso, Shorter, Cowell, and Cellelo.

The court also allowed related supervisory claims to proceed against Johnson Piper, Richardson, Moser, Kniesel, Sadjak, Benoit, and Kosloski. It found that Benson’s allegations, including his assertion that defendants refused to allow hearings or implement procedures protecting his rights, plausibly connected those defendants to the alleged due-process violations. The remaining Fourteenth Amendment and supervisory claims were dismissed without prejudice.

Substantive due process

The court dismissed Benson’s substantive-due-process claims based on his high-security-area placements. It agreed that the applicable standard asked whether the conduct was so egregious or outrageous that it shocked the conscience. The court rejected Benson’s argument that the professional-judgment standard applied because the placements did not involve the actual physical restraint required for that standard.

Even assuming the placements were unwarranted, the court concluded that two temporary placements did not reach the level of a brutal or inhumane abuse of power that shocks the conscience. The court also dismissed the claim concerning placement in Omega Two for the same reason and noted that the complaint did not refer to placements in Omega One or Omega Three.

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity is a protection from civil liability for officials who did not violate a clearly established right. The court agreed that the defendants were not yet entitled to that protection for the challenged searches and high-security placements. Because the record did not clearly show whether the defendants acted for a legitimate government interest, the court could not determine at the motion-to-dismiss stage whether qualified immunity applied.

Punitive damages and final disposition

The court declined to strike Benson’s request for punitive damages. It found that the record was not yet clear enough to determine whether defendants acted with an evil motive, malicious intent, or reckless or callous indifference to federally protected rights. The request to strike punitive damages was therefore denied without prejudice.

The court overruled both parties’ objections and adopted Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung’s January 25, 2019 Report and Recommendation. It granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows:

- Claims for monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities were dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. - Claims based on the Minnesota Constitution were dismissed with prejudice. - Official-capacity claims were dismissed without prejudice. - First Amendment claims were dismissed without prejudice, except for retaliation claims against McGowan and Kosloski. - Fourth Amendment claims were dismissed without prejudice, except for the search claims against Wyatt, Beavens, Shorter, and Fischer concerning the December 6 and 7 searches. - Fourteenth Amendment claims were dismissed without prejudice, except for the specified procedural-due-process claims concerning the December 6 and 7 high-security-area placements. - Supervisory claims were dismissed without prejudice, except for the claims against Kosloski connected to the First Amendment claims and the claims against Johnson Piper, Richardson, Moser, Kniesel, Sadjak, Benoit, and Kosloski connected to the procedural-due-process claims. - The request to strike punitive damages was denied without prejudice.

The opinion is a procedural order because it ruled on a motion to dismiss, even though the court addressed the plausibility of several claims and allowed some to continue.