Whipple v. Stenger

Background

Michael R. Whipple, who was involuntarily civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, sued several MSOP officials. He alleged violations of constitutional rights arising from a July 2009 fight at an MSOP facility. After the fight, officials handcuffed him, searched him with a pat-down and metal-detecting wand, took him to a High Security Area, and told him he would need to undergo a strip search before the handcuffs would be removed. He was also placed on Administrative Restriction, which limited his time outside his cell and barred visitors and therapeutic programming.

Whipple asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due-process protections, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Sixth Amendment, and the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of association. The defendants moved to dismiss. Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer recommended dismissing all defendants except Dennis Benson and Gary Grimm, and recommended allowing only Whipple’s Fourth Amendment strip-search claim against Benson and Grimm to proceed. Both sides objected.

District Court’s Review

The district court reviewed Whipple’s objections for clear error because they largely repeated arguments presented to the magistrate judge. It concluded that Whipple received adequate procedural protections concerning his placement in the High Security Area, even assuming he had a protected liberty interest in less restrictive conditions. The court therefore dismissed his procedural due-process claim.

The court also upheld dismissal of Whipple’s Fourth Amendment claim concerning his continued confinement in the High Security Area. It relied on procedures requiring review of the restriction and permitting it to be lifted when the investigation ended or when authorized MSOP officials determined it should be lifted.

The court declined to consider Whipple’s expanded First Amendment argument because he raised it for the first time in his objections. It stated that, even if it considered the argument, the restriction was reasonably related to legitimate institutional purposes: protecting other MSOP clients and allowing the fight to be investigated. The court also rejected Whipple’s substantive due-process argument, finding that he had not alleged conduct that would amount to a constitutional violation. The court noted that he received food and medical care, daily time outside his cell, and access to his property.

Strip-Search Claim and Earlier Class Action

The defendants argued that issue preclusion barred Whipple’s Fourth Amendment strip-search claim. Issue preclusion is a rule that prevents a party from relitigating an issue already decided in an earlier case when specified requirements are met.

The court found those requirements satisfied. Whipple was a member of the class in an earlier case concerning MSOP policies, even though he was not a named plaintiff. That earlier case addressed the same strip-search policy, the constitutionality of the policy was litigated, and the earlier court entered a valid and final judgment. The court further found that the earlier determination that the search policies did not violate the Fourth Amendment was essential to that judgment. The court therefore concluded that Whipple was barred from relitigating the constitutionality of the search policy and dismissed his strip-search claim.

Disposition

The court overruled Whipple’s objections and sustained the defendants’ objection. It adopted the Report and Recommendation in part and rejected it in part, granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed Whipple’s action with prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered.