Mays v. Yarbrough

Background

Pro se plaintiff Otis Mays sued Travis Yarbrough, Richard Waller, and John Doe in their individual and official capacities. Mays’s claims arose from his 2019 arrest at the Hennepin County Courthouse. According to the complaint, Yarbrough and Waller arrested him under two active warrants, knocked him to the ground, and placed his arms behind his back despite his statements that he had an injured shoulder. Mays alleged that Waller applied additional pressure to his arm and later intentionally applied pressure to his injured shoulder during an interrogation. He also alleged that Yarbrough and John Doe failed to intervene.

Mays further alleged that the agents violated his right to remain silent after discussing a law he understood to mean that he could be charged if he stayed silent. He alleged that the agents obtained access to his phone, took it from him, and searched it without a warrant. He asserted claims under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Official-Capacity Claims

The court dismissed the official-capacity claims with prejudice. It explained that claims under Bivens—a judge-made damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officials—may be brought against individual defendants in their personal capacities, not against them in their official capacities. The court also stated that Bivens does not waive the government’s protection from such official-capacity suits.

Individual-Capacity Claims

The court evaluated Mays’s individual-capacity claims under the Supreme Court’s two-step Bivens framework. First, it asked whether the claims arose in a “new context,” meaning a context meaningfully different from the few situations in which the Supreme Court has recognized a Bivens damages remedy. The court concluded that every one of Mays’s claims arose in a new context.

The court explained that the Supreme Court has not recognized a Bivens remedy for First Amendment claims. It also said that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state actors, not federal officials. Mays’s Fifth Amendment claim concerned the right to remain silent and Miranda warnings, rather than the Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim for which a Bivens remedy has been recognized. The court further treated the excessive-force claims involving Mays’s treatment as a pretrial detainee as due-process claims rather than Eighth Amendment claims, and found them different from the recognized Bivens claim involving inadequate medical care by a federal prison official.

The court also found that Mays’s Fourth Amendment claims arose in a new context. Although the original Bivens case involved an unlawful arrest and search, Mays was arrested in public under two active warrants, and his allegations involved the use of force, alleged failure to intervene, and a warrantless search of his phone. The court concluded that these actions and alleged injuries meaningfully differed from those in the original Bivens case.

Second, the court considered whether special factors counseled against creating a new Bivens remedy. For the First Amendment claim, it concluded that Congress was better suited to weigh the costs and benefits of imposing damages liability on federal officers. More broadly, it found that an alternative remedial structure existed because the Department of Justice inspector general could investigate allegations of wrongdoing or misconduct by FBI agents, and Mays could also submit a complaint to an FBI field office. The court concluded that these factors cautioned against extending Bivens to Mays’s claims.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order states that Mays’s claims against the defendants in both their individual and official capacities were dismissed with prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly. Judge Donovan W. Frank signed the order on January 18, 2024.