Markel v. Douglas Technologies Group, Inc.

Background

Anthony Markel alleged that a Sport Blue Label wheel manufactured and sold by Douglas Technologies Group, Inc., doing business as Douglas Wheel Technologies (DWT), came apart during an ATV race on June 16, 2013. His ATV rolled over, he was thrown into a wall, and he was severely injured. Markel asserted claims for products liability, failure to warn, breach of warranty, negligence, and post-sale failure to warn.

DWT moved for summary judgment, which is a request for judgment without a trial because the moving party claims there is no genuine dispute about an important fact and it is entitled to judgment under the law. DWT primarily argued that Markel’s liability expert, Christopher Brand, had not provided the opinions needed to support the claims. Markel argued that Brand’s testimony created factual disputes and that expert testimony was not necessary for some issues.

Products Liability, Warranty, and Negligence Claims

The court treated Markel’s products-liability, breach-of-warranty, and negligence claims as one products-liability claim under Minnesota law. To proceed, Markel needed evidence that the wheel was defective and unreasonably dangerous for an intended or reasonably foreseeable use, that the defect existed when the wheel left DWT’s control, and that the defect was the direct cause of his injury. The court did not address the second element because neither party discussed it in their briefs.

The court held that expert engineering testimony was necessary to determine whether the wheel’s design was unreasonably dangerous and whether the alleged design problem caused the crash. Brand’s report identified the distance between the wheel’s bolt holes and its inner edge as outside generally accepted design guidelines, stated that the design created a potential for the rim to tear out, and stated that an alternative design was feasible. But the report did not say that the design was an unreasonably dangerous condition under Minnesota’s reasonable-care balancing test. Brand also testified that he had not formed an engineering opinion that the wheel’s design defect made it unreasonably dangerous.

The court separately held that Brand could not provide the necessary causation opinion. His reports described the alleged design feature as creating a potential for tear-out and said that tear-out was consistent with the wheel’s failure, but he did not connect the feature to the accident as its proximate cause. At his deposition, Brand testified that he did not know what stress or load caused the failure, where the relevant cracks originated, or whether the wheel had been damaged before the race. The court concluded that speculation could not support a jury verdict against DWT and granted summary judgment on the products-liability claim.

Failure-to-Warn Claims

Markel argued that DWT should have permanently marked or engraved the Blue Label wheel to state that it was not meant for racing. The court rejected the failure-to-warn claim for two independent reasons. First, the record did not contain affirmative evidence that the alleged wheel defect made the product unreasonably dangerous for racing or that DWT had reason to know of a danger requiring such a warning. The court noted that DWT warned against racing with Blue Label wheels but that its corporate witness testified DWT did not consider the wheel dangerous for racing.

Second, even assuming DWT had a duty to warn and its existing usage chart was inadequate, Markel offered no admissible evidence that the absence of a permanent warning caused his injury. The court found no evidence that a wheel defect caused the crash and no evidence that Markel would have stopped using the wheel if DWT had provided an adequate racing warning. The court also held that this was not one of the special cases in which Minnesota recognizes a post-sale duty to warn about a hidden defect. It therefore granted summary judgment on both the failure-to-warn and post-sale failure-to-warn claims.

Disposition

Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted DWT’s motion for summary judgment. The order states that the motion was granted and that Markel’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice, meaning the claims could not be brought again in this case.