Melgar v. Barr

Background

Gilma Geanette Melgar and Aurelia Concepcion Martinez were beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status (TPS). Melgar is identified in the opinion as a citizen of El Salvador who entered the United States unlawfully without inspection in February 1992. Martinez is identified as a citizen of Honduras who entered unlawfully without inspection in November 1996. Both later applied for and received TPS, including extensions.

Each plaintiff’s adult daughter, who is a United States citizen, petitioned for an immigrant visa for her. The plaintiffs also applied for family-based adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requested evidence of lawful admission or parole. The plaintiffs responded with evidence of their TPS and cited an earlier District of Minnesota decision. USCIS nevertheless denied their applications, reasoning that TPS did not constitute admission and that the plaintiffs had not been in lawful status when TPS was granted.

Issue and parties’ positions

The issue was whether a grant of TPS satisfies the requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) that an applicant for adjustment of status have been “inspected and admitted or paroled” into the United States.

The plaintiffs argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4), which provides that a TPS beneficiary is considered to be in and maintaining lawful status as a nonimmigrant for purposes of adjustment under § 1255, applies to the entire adjustment statute. They argued that this language makes TPS beneficiaries eligible to satisfy the inspection-and-admission requirement despite an unlawful entry.

The defendants argued that § 1255(a)’s admission requirement is separate from the lawful-status requirements elsewhere in § 1255. They maintained that “admission” means lawful physical entry after inspection and that TPS grants lawful status but does not provide admission. They therefore argued that USCIS properly denied the plaintiffs’ applications.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the framework used to review an agency’s interpretation of a statute. It first examined whether Congress had clearly answered the statutory question. The court concluded that § 1254a(f)(4), read in context, is clear and unambiguous.

The court held that the statute’s reference to adjustment of status “under section 1255” applies to the entire section, not merely to its lawful-status provisions. It also found the statute’s use of the term “nonimmigrant” significant because, in the court’s reading, nonimmigrant status entails inspection and admission. The court further reasoned that immigration law does not limit the concept of admission to a port-of-entry inspection and has recognized that adjustment of status can function as a form of admission.

The court rejected the defendants’ interpretation and declined to follow the narrower approach described in a decision from the Eleventh Circuit. It concluded that § 1254a(f)(4) satisfies both requirements the defendants identified: admission, because TPS confers nonimmigrant status, and lawful status, because the statute expressly provides that TPS beneficiaries are considered to be in and maintaining lawful status.

Disposition

The court held that when a person is granted TPS, the grant satisfies the threshold inspection-and-admission requirement of § 1255(a) for purposes of eligibility to seek adjustment to LPR status. The court did not itself grant the plaintiffs LPR status; it remanded the matter to USCIS for adjudication consistent with the opinion.

Judge Donovan W. Frank granted the plaintiffs’ First Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and ordered the remand to USCIS.