Eilen v. Minneapolis Public Schools

Background

Linda J. Eilen taught for Minneapolis Public Schools during the 2015–2016 school year, when Kristiana Ward was principal of Bryn Mawr Elementary School. Eilen experienced several medical and family-related events, took intermittent leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and later took leave after a car accident. She also served as the school’s teachers’ union building steward.

During the school year, Ward and Eilen had meetings about parent complaints, Eilen received a notice of concern, Ward instructed her not to communicate with Bryn Mawr staff while she was on medical leave, and Eilen was transferred to a Reserve on Special Assignment position after her doctor approved her to work only three days per week. Her pay and benefits were not affected by the transfer. After Eilen moved her personal belongings from her classroom, the school placed her on administrative leave, investigated the condition of the classroom, and imposed a five-day suspension.

Eilen sued Minneapolis Public Schools and Ward in her individual and official capacities. She alleged that the defendants violated the FMLA, Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state or local officials for violating federal rights. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which is judgment without a trial when the evidence shows that no reasonable jury could find for the opposing party and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

FMLA claim

Eilen characterized her FMLA claim as retaliation; the defendants described it as FMLA discrimination. The court explained that, regardless of the label, Eilen needed evidence that the defendants took adverse action because she exercised rights protected by the FMLA.

Eilen identified six alleged adverse actions: the September 30 and October 9 meetings, the December 3 meeting and notice of concern, Ward’s March 9 email, the five-day suspension, and her emotional and physical injuries. The court held that only the unpaid suspension qualified as an adverse employment action. The meetings and email did not change Eilen’s pay, benefits, job duties, or career prospects. The notice of concern also did not qualify because there was no evidence that it led to any adverse action. Her emotional and physical consequences could be relevant to damages but were not themselves adverse employment actions.

Eilen relied only on timing to show that her suspension was connected to her FMLA leave. The court determined that MPS learned of her planned leave on January 27, 2016, while the suspension notice was issued on June 7, 2016. The court held that the more-than-four-month gap was too long, without additional evidence, to establish the required causal connection. It therefore granted summary judgment to MPS on the FMLA claim.

Minnesota Whistleblower Act claim

The Minnesota Whistleblower Act protects an employee who reports a violation of law from retaliation. Eilen argued that she was retaliated against for reporting alleged violations involving the FMLA, public employees’ union rights, and the First Amendment.

The court found no evidence that Eilen reported any actual, suspected, or planned legal violation to MPS before her suspension. The December 9 meeting that Eilen facilitated as union steward concerned Ward’s management and treatment of staff, but Eilen identified no evidence that the meeting involved a report of a legal violation. The court therefore granted MPS summary judgment on the Whistleblower Act claim.

Section 1983 claims

Eilen alleged that her rights to freedom of association and to be free from a hostile work environment were violated. The court dismissed any claims based directly on the Minnesota Constitution because § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of federal rights, and the court stated that Minnesota law does not recognize a private cause of action for violations of the Minnesota Constitution.

As to MPS, the court held that Eilen had not identified a district policy, custom, or practice that caused a federal-rights violation. A governmental entity may be liable under § 1983 only when an official policy, custom, or practice was the moving force behind the violation. The court also rejected the official-capacity claim against Ward as duplicative of the claim against MPS.

The court found that Eilen had not adequately supported her individual-capacity claim against Ward. Eilen did not identify a recognized constitutional right violated by the alleged workplace bullying and did not allege that the hostile work environment was based on race or sex. The court also found that Eilen lacked evidence connecting Ward to the decisions to transfer or suspend her through an unlawful “cat’s paw” theory, which can impose liability when a biased official improperly influences an independent decisionmaker. Finally, the court held that claims based on Ward’s handling of Eilen’s FMLA leave had to be brought under the FMLA rather than converted into constitutional claims under § 1983.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that the defendants’ summary-judgment motion was granted. The court ordered that Eilen’s complaint was dismissed with prejudice and directed that judgment be entered.