Leftwich v. County of Dakota
- Joan Ericksen
- 0:18-cv-01144
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 15
In Leftwich v. County of Dakota, Magistrate Judge Thorson denied Leftwich’s request to extend deadlines and amend his complaint because he lacked diligence.
Leroy Leftwich and the defendants in the case. The ruling denied Leftwich’s request to extend the scheduling deadlines and amend his complaint; it did not decide the merits of his constitutional tort claims.
What happened
In Leftwich v. County of Dakota, Leroy Leftwich asked to extend the deadline for amending his complaint. He wanted to add alleged customs and practices involving medical and mental-health care by the City of Eagan and Dakota County.
The court applied the stricter standard for requests made after a scheduling-order deadline and required Leftwich to show good cause. It found that he had not acted diligently because he waited until after the deadline to schedule depositions and had other opportunities to seek information or ask for more time.
The court denied the motion to amend the scheduling order and complaint. Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson did not decide whether the proposed amendments were legally sufficient or whether they needed to be included.
The detailed version
- Leftwich v. County of Dakota · No. 0:18-cv-01144
- Joan Ericksen
- Apr. 9, 2019
Background
Leroy Leftwich sued the County of Dakota and other defendants. The defendants included the City of Eagan, individual Eagan defendants, the County of Dakota, and individual County defendants. Leftwich sought to amend his complaint to add alleged customs and practices supporting his constitutional tort claims.
The proposed amendments alleged four additional customs and practices by the City of Eagan concerning the completion and transmission of an Offender Tracking Form and the communication of medical and mental-health information. They also alleged four additional customs and practices by Dakota County concerning mental-health screening, identifying suicidal inmates, and responding to medical or mental distress in the Dakota County Jail.
The scheduling order required motions to amend the pleadings to be filed by October 29, 2018, and required the parties to diligently pursue discovery needed to meet that deadline. Leftwich filed his motion on January 2, 2019, more than two months after the deadline and on the day fact discovery closed.
Legal standard
Because the amendment deadline had expired, the court applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), rather than the more permissive Rule 15(a) standard. Rule 16(b)(4) allows a scheduling-order deadline to be changed only for good cause. The primary measure of good cause is the moving party’s diligence in trying to meet the deadline. The question was whether the schedule could not reasonably be met despite Leftwich’s diligence.
Court’s reasoning
Leftwich argued that he learned about the additional customs and practices through depositions taken in December 2018. The court found that he did not seek to take those depositions until November 2018, weeks after the amendment deadline. The court therefore viewed the delay in scheduling the depositions as self-imposed.
The court rejected Leftwich’s argument that the later discovery deadline justified the late amendment. The scheduling order expressly required the parties to pursue discovery needed for amendments before the amendment deadline. The court explained that the earlier deadline was intended to allow discovery on any permitted amended pleadings before fact discovery closed.
The court also rejected arguments that written discovery responses had prevented earlier discovery of the proposed customs and practices. It found that Leftwich’s examples largely concerned unwritten practices that were more appropriately explored through depositions. The defendants’ written discovery objections and responses had also put Leftwich on notice that depositions might be necessary. The court noted that he could have scheduled the depositions earlier, sought more complete answers, or asked to change the deadlines before the amendment deadline expired.
The court did not decide whether the proposed amendments were required to be pleaded or whether they were sufficiently pleaded. It addressed only whether Leftwich had shown good cause under Rule 16 to amend the scheduling order and add the proposed claims.
Disposition
The court ordered that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Scheduling Order to Extend Time and to Amend Complaint was DENIED. The order did not state that the motion was denied with or without prejudice. The court also noted that Leftwich’s separate motion seeking consolidation of related cases or, alternatively, amendment would be addressed in a later order.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.