Graham v. Barnette

Background

Teresa M. Graham sued Sergeant Shannon L. Barnette, Officers Amanda Sanchez and Mohamed Noor, and the City of Minneapolis. She brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil-rights statute, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and also asserted Minnesota state-law claims.

The dispute arose after Graham made several calls to police and 911 on May 25, 2017. Her cousin reported that Graham had threatened him and his family. Officers Noor and Sanchez conducted a welfare check, but Graham told them to leave. After Graham made additional 911 calls, Barnette directed the officers to place her in custody for an emergency mental-health evaluation under Minnesota’s Civil Commitment and Treatment Act. The officers later entered Graham’s home, held her by the arms for about six minutes, and escorted her to an ambulance. She was taken to a hospital and released after examination by a doctor.

The Minneapolis police department’s transport-hold policy allowed officers to take a person with mental illness into custody when there was a reason to believe the person posed a threat to himself or others. The policy also stated that the threat did not have to be imminent.

Summary-judgment standard

The court applied the summary-judgment standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is proper when the record shows no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Graham as the nonmoving party.

Claims against the officers

The officers invoked qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from damages liability unless the evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, shows a constitutional or statutory violation and the violated right was clearly established at the time.

For the warrantless-entry claim, the court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The officers entered Graham’s home during a welfare check after receiving information about a threat, repeated 911 calls, Graham’s agitated behavior, her mental-health history, prior restraining orders, and a warning that she might fight with police. The court concluded that existing precedent did not clearly establish whether those circumstances justified entering Graham’s home without a warrant under the community-caretaking exception.

For the seizure claim, the court held that the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause when officers seize someone for an emergency mental-health evaluation. Probable cause existed only if the facts known to the officers would have led a prudent person to believe Graham was mentally ill and in danger of injuring herself or others if not immediately detained.

The court found a genuine dispute about whether probable cause existed. Graham was verbally hostile and agitated, but she did not threaten physical harm or physically resist the officers. The court stated that agitation alone does not necessarily establish a likelihood of physical harm, and a reasonable juror could find that the reported telephone threat to Graham’s cousin, made hours earlier, was too speculative to establish probable cause. Even so, the officers received qualified immunity because the applicable constitutional standard was not clearly established in the Eighth Circuit, particularly in light of conflicting standards in the federal cases.

The court also granted the officers qualified immunity on Graham’s excessive-force claim. It characterized the six-minute escort hold as minimal force and concluded that a reasonable officer would not have understood that conduct to be excessive under the circumstances.

The court rejected Graham’s property-damage claims. It held that her Fourteenth Amendment property claim was barred because she had not alleged that state-law remedies and the Minneapolis claims process were inadequate. It also held that the record did not establish a Fourth Amendment seizure of her property because removing the screen from the door did not meaningfully interfere with her possessory interest beyond a temporary deprivation.

The court granted summary judgment on Graham’s conspiracy claim because the record contained no evidence of an agreement or “meeting of minds” among the officers to deprive her of constitutional rights.

The court also granted summary judgment on Graham’s retaliatory-arrest claim. Although the court concluded that a reasonable juror could find that the officers lacked probable cause, it found no evidence that Graham’s complaints about police were a substantial factor or the but-for cause of the seizure. The record instead showed the officers were responding to concerns about a possible mental-health emergency.

Claims against the City of Minneapolis

Graham asserted that the City’s transport-hold policy violated the Fourth Amendment and that the City failed to train and supervise its officers properly. The court held that the policy was facially unconstitutional because it allowed a mental-health seizure based on reasonable belief rather than the constitutionally required probable cause.

The court also held that a reasonable juror could find that the officers implemented the policy when they seized Graham without probable cause. It therefore denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count 5, which alleged that the City violated Graham’s Fourth Amendment rights by maintaining the unlawful transport-hold policy.

The court granted summary judgment on Count 6, the failure-to-train claim. Graham had not produced evidence that the City’s training practices reflected a deliberate or conscious choice to violate constitutional rights, as required for municipal liability under § 1983.

State-law claims and immunity

The court held that the officers were protected by statutory immunity under Minnesota’s Civil Commitment and Treatment Act because they acted in good faith and relied on information they considered reliable. The officers also received official immunity because their decisions involved professional judgment and the evidence did not show that they intentionally acted in a way they believed the law prohibited. Because the officers were entitled to official immunity, the City received related vicarious official immunity for the state-law claims.

Expert-witness motion and disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to exclude Graham’s expert opinions without prejudice because it did not need to rely on those opinions to decide summary judgment. The defendants could renew that motion closer to trial.

The final order granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ summary-judgment motion. It granted the motion as to Counts 1–4 and 6–10, and those claims were dismissed with prejudice. It denied the motion as to Count 5. It also denied without prejudice the motion to exclude expert opinions. Judge Joan N. Ericksen signed the order.