Long M. v. Berryhill

Background

Long M. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits. He alleged disability beginning February 26, 2014. After a hearing, the administrative law judge found that Long M. had major depression as a severe impairment but that his other physical impairments—including a stroke, diabetes, hypertension, chronic kidney disease, renal insufficiency, right-eye impairment, loss of bladder and bowel control, and pain, numbness, and weakness in his extremities—were not severe.

The administrative law judge determined that Long M. could perform work at all exertional levels, subject to nonphysical limits. He was limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks; occasional interaction with supervisors; and occasional brief and superficial contact with coworkers and the public. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge found that Long M. could perform his past work as a machine packager and, alternatively, jobs such as kitchen helper, laundry worker, hand packager, and cleaner. The Appeals Council denied review, making the administrative law judge’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Issues and analysis

Long M. raised three challenges: the administrative law judge’s treatment of the opinions of his treating psychologist, Willie B. Garrett, LP; the treatment of the physical limitations identified by his treating physician, Shihshen (Angela) Yiu, M.D.; and the constitutional validity of the administrative law judge’s appointment.

Treating psychologist’s opinion

Garrett completed questionnaires describing extreme mental limitations, including marked or extreme limitations in work-related abilities, concentration, social functioning, and daily activities. Garrett also stated that Long M. would be absent more than four days per month and off task for more than 20 percent of an eight-hour workday.

The administrative law judge gave Garrett’s opinions little weight. The stated reasons included the opinions’ checkbox format, limited explanation, reliance primarily on Long M.’s history of strokes, lack of neuropsychological testing or other objective support, inconsistency with the treatment record, and the conservative course of mental-health treatment. The court acknowledged that an opinion cannot be rejected solely because it uses checkbox categories, but explained that conclusory opinions lacking supporting clinical findings may receive less weight. The court found that Garrett’s extreme limitations were inconsistent with his treatment notes and other medical evidence, including records showing that Long M. was generally alert, oriented, cooperative, and engaged, and that his depression improved after beginning Prozac. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the administrative law judge’s residual functional capacity assessment, which incorporated some mental limitations but not the extreme limitations described by Garrett.

Treating physician’s opinion

Dr. Yiu completed a physical residual functional capacity questionnaire describing restrictions involving sitting, standing, walking, lifting, rest breaks, position changes, concentration, stress, and absenteeism. She also wrote that Long M.’s disability was mainly cognitive and that he had fewer physical limitations.

The administrative law judge gave Dr. Yiu’s opinion little weight because it was largely presented on a checkbox form, provided little explanation—particularly for the proposed absenteeism—and conflicted with her treatment records showing largely unremarkable physical examinations. The administrative law judge also noted that Dr. Yiu was a general practitioner rather than a relevant specialist. The court found substantial evidence supporting this decision, including the lack of significant physical findings, Long M.’s generally normal gait and physical examinations, and the conservative treatment of his chronic kidney disease.

The court rejected the argument that stage-three chronic kidney disease automatically required a light-work limitation. It explained that the residual functional capacity depends on a claimant’s actual capabilities and limitations, not merely on a diagnosis. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that carpal tunnel syndrome did not last for the required continuous 12-month period. The record included a finding of mild left carpal tunnel syndrome followed two months later by an examination finding no evidence of carpal tunnel syndrome. The court further noted the inconsistency between Dr. Yiu’s extensive physical restrictions and her statement that Long M.’s disability was mainly cognitive.

Appointments Clause challenge

Long M. argued that remand was required because the administrative law judge was an inferior officer who had not been appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. Long M. acknowledged that he had not raised the issue before the Social Security Administration.

The court explained that the Eighth Circuit treats an Appointments Clause challenge as nonjurisdictional, meaning that it can be forfeited if not raised during the administrative process. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. SEC and Eighth Circuit precedent, the court held that Long M. waived the challenge by failing to raise it at any point before the agency. The court distinguished the rule that Social Security claimants need not present every issue to the Appeals Council, explaining that this did not eliminate the requirement to timely raise an Appointments Clause challenge before the administrative body.

Disposition

The court ordered that Long M.’s motion for summary judgment was DENIED, the Acting Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment was GRANTED, and the case was DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.