Wattleton v. Hodge

Background

David Earl Wattleton filed this action representing himself. He is involuntarily committed under 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e). He alleged that Federal Medical Center Rochester officials were withdrawing money from his account to collect filing fees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. He sought an order stopping the withdrawals and returning money already collected.

Wattleton initially identified the defendant as the trust-fund administrator by title rather than by name. Because Tanya Hodge held that position, the court substituted Hodge as the proper defendant.

Wattleton brought a constitutional damages claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics and sought injunctive relief. A magistrate judge recommended dismissing the action, concluding that Hodge had sovereign or qualified immunity on the damages claim and that Wattleton had adequate procedures for challenging the fee collections on his due-process claim.

Rulings on the objections

The court overruled Wattleton’s objections and accepted the report and recommendation, subject to its additional analysis.

Wattleton argued that his complaint should be understood as suing Hodge in her personal capacity because a Bivens claim imposes personal liability on a federal official. The court agreed that, in this case, the silent complaint should be interpreted as asserting the Bivens claim against Hodge in her individual capacity.

The court nevertheless held that qualified immunity protected Hodge. Qualified immunity generally shields government officials from damages liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right. The court reasoned that Hodge was following facially valid court orders directing the collection of fees. She did not decide whether Wattleton was subject to the fees and lacked authority to make that determination. The court also rejected Wattleton’s argument that Hodge acted with a discriminatory motive because the complaints did not plead facts suggesting discrimination, and Wattleton could not raise that theory for the first time in his objections.

The court also rejected Wattleton’s procedural-due-process claim. It held that he had access to a pre-deprivation remedy: he could have applied to proceed without prepaying fees and indicated that his civil-commitment status exempted him from the prisoner filing-fee requirements. The court noted that Wattleton instead signed consent forms for fee withdrawals in both cases. The court further held that he had an adequate post-deprivation remedy because he could return to the courts that had ordered the collections and request that those orders be rescinded. One court had already stopped collection and ordered a refund.

Motions to amend

Wattleton filed two motions to amend. The proposed allegations concerned money spent from the trust fund on items such as televisions and satellite television, his inability to choose television channels, and alleged different treatment based on his status as an insanity acquittee.

The court denied both motions because the proposed claims were futile, meaning they would not state a legally sufficient claim even if added to the complaint. The court held that detainees do not have a constitutional right to watch television or select a television channel. It also rejected the proposed equal-protection theory. Wattleton did not adequately allege that he was similarly situated to the inmates in another housing unit or that the challenged policy lacked a rational connection to the government’s legitimate interest in institutional security.

Disposition

The court ordered the following: Tanya Hodge was substituted as defendant; Wattleton’s objections were overruled; the report and recommendation was accepted subject to the court’s additional analysis; Hodge’s motion to dismiss was granted; Wattleton’s opposition motion was denied; both motions to amend were denied; and the amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.