Evans v. Cooperative Response Center, Inc.

Background

Tori Evans worked for Cooperative Response Center, Inc. (CRC) as the only administrative assistant in CRC’s Austin, Minnesota office. Her duties included reception, answering phones, managing mail, monitoring office equipment, and assisting with accounting tasks. The court noted that regular attendance was important because many duties could not wait for her return and were usually handled by her supervisor when she was absent.

CRC used a rolling 12-month attendance policy that assigned event points for certain absences. An employee who reached 10 points in a 12-month period was terminated. Absences that were part of approved Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave did not receive points. CRC also required employees using intermittent FMLA leave to notify their manager before the shift and contact Human Resources.

Evans developed serious health problems in 2016 and was diagnosed with reactive arthritis, an autoimmune disorder. Based on medical certifications, CRC approved her for two full days and two half days of intermittent FMLA leave per month. From April 2016 through her termination, Evans used more than 30 days of FMLA leave, but CRC also counted 11 absences as unplanned absences. The points included six absences exceeding her certified leave amount, two points for absences related to a knee problem that CRC and an orthopedic specialist determined were unrelated to her reactive arthritis, one point for failing to notify Human Resources, and 1.5 points for absences involving a lost voice and fever without identifying them as FMLA-related.

On March 27, 2017, Evans reached 10 attendance points. CRC terminated her for excessive and unexcused absences and cited noncompliance with its attendance, employee-conduct, and work-rules policies. Evans sued in February 2018, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the FMLA. CRC moved for summary judgment on all claims.

ADA claims

The court granted summary judgment on Evans’s ADA discrimination claim. To establish a basic case of disability discrimination, Evans had to show that she had an ADA-covered disability, was qualified to perform the essential functions of her job with or without accommodation, and suffered an adverse employment action because of her disability.

The court held that Evans could not show she was qualified because she could not attend work on a regular and reliable basis. Her doctor could not predict when her flare-ups would occur, how severe they would be, or how long they would last. The court concluded that attendance was an essential function of her position and that CRC was not required to reassign those essential duties to other employees.

The court also held that, even if Evans could establish the basic elements of discrimination, she had not shown that CRC’s attendance-based explanation was a pretext, meaning a false reason masking discrimination. The court found no evidence that CRC departed from its normal policies, treated similar employees differently, lacked a factual basis for its explanation, or changed its explanation. The court relied in part on Evans’s statement that she had exceeded the attendance limits and that CRC needed to treat employees the same.

The court rejected Evans’s ADA failure-to-accommodate claim for the same basic reason. Evans proposed allowing her to take FMLA leave beyond the amount certified by her doctor without receiving attendance points. The court held that this request was not a reasonable accommodation because additional unscheduled absences would not allow her to perform the essential functions of her job.

The court also rejected Evans’s ADA retaliation claim. It assumed that requesting FMLA leave could qualify as protected activity under the ADA but held that Evans could not establish the required causal connection between that activity and her termination. The court found that the eight-month period between her initial request for intermittent FMLA leave and her termination was too long, standing alone, to support causation. It also reiterated that absence from work was not a reasonable accommodation.

FMLA claims

The court granted summary judgment on Evans’s FMLA entitlement claim. Such a claim concerns whether an employer denied leave to which an employee was entitled. The court examined Evans’s arguments concerning three categories of absences.

First, the court held that CRC properly denied leave for October 17, 2016, because Evans did not follow CRC’s requirement to notify Human Resources. The court also held that her March 22 and March 24, 2017 absences did not trigger CRC’s FMLA obligations because she reported being sick with a lost voice and a fever but did not identify the absences as related to her FMLA-covered condition. The court additionally noted that those symptoms were not listed in her medical certification.

Second, the court held that CRC lawfully denied six absences that exceeded the frequency and duration of leave certified and later recertified by Evans’s doctor. CRC had notified Evans that her absences exceeded the approved amount and had sought recertification. The doctor recertified the same frequency and duration of leave rather than increasing it.

Third, the court held that Evans was not entitled to FMLA protection for her July 11 through July 15, 2016 absences because the evidence showed that they involved a knee problem unrelated to her reactive arthritis. The court also rejected Evans’s argument that her termination unlawfully deprived her of more than six weeks of unused FMLA leave, concluding that the evidence showed she was terminated for excessive unexcused absences rather than for exercising FMLA rights.

The court separately rejected Evans’s FMLA discrimination or retaliation claim. It held that the eight-month gap between her first request for FMLA leave and her termination was too long to establish a causal connection. Even assuming she could establish an initial case, the court held that CRC had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason—violation of its 10-point attendance policy—and that Evans had not shown that reason was a pretext.

Lost-wages issue and disposition

CRC argued that Evans could not recover lost wages after May 18, 2017, when the Minnesota Unemployment Insurance Program determined that she was unable to perform paid employment. The court did not decide that issue because Evans’s claims did not survive summary judgment. The court stated that, even if it had reached the issue, the evidence would limit any wage-loss period to August 2017 or earlier.

Judge Ann D. Montgomery ordered that CRC’s motion for summary judgment was granted and that the complaint was dismissed. The opinion does not state whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.