Camie P. v. Saul

Background

Camie P. sought judicial review of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. She originally alleged disability beginning April 24, 2015, but later amended the alleged onset date to January 13, 2017. The court’s review was limited to the period from January 13 through July 3, 2017. The Commissioner later approved a separate application beginning July 4, 2017.

After a hearing, Administrative Law Judge Michael N. Balter found that Camie P. had severe degenerative joint disease in both knees and hips, residuals of bilateral hip and knee replacements, and myofascial pain syndrome. He found that her depression was not severe. He determined that she had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, with a required one- to two-minute position change after 30 minutes of continuous sitting. Based on that capacity, he found that she could perform her past work as a substance abuse counselor and was not disabled.

Issue

Camie P. argued that the administrative law judge committed reversible error by failing to decide at the second step whether her anxiety was a severe or non-severe impairment. She also argued that the judge did not adequately consider anxiety at later stages of the disability analysis. The Commissioner argued that any error was harmless because the judge identified other severe impairments, continued through the remaining steps, and considered anxiety-related evidence.

Court’s analysis

The court agreed that the administrative law judge did not specifically decide whether anxiety was an impairment that was severe or non-severe. The judge discussed anxiety as part of the depression analysis but did not separately classify it at the second step.

The court held that this omission was harmless. It followed the prevailing approach in the District of Minnesota that a second-step error does not require a remand when the administrative law judge considers the impairment and its effects when determining residual functional capacity. The court found no reason to treat a failure to classify an impairment as different from a failure to address it, as long as the impairment’s limitations are considered later in the process.

The court found that the administrative law judge had considered anxiety and related symptoms. The judge discussed Camie P.’s reports of anxiety at large gatherings, poor memory, and difficulty finishing tasks. The judge nevertheless found no mental limitations, relying in part on a December 2016 medical note stating that Camie P. had no significant anxiety, depression, or panic; the lack of medical records showing limiting anxiety during the relevant period; and evidence that she had met or exceeded performance expectations in her counseling work through January 2017.

The court also concluded that adding anxiety to the list of impairments would not have changed the third-step analysis because the record lacked supporting medical evidence of limiting anxiety during the relevant period. The court stated that Camie P. had not shown that the omission affected the remaining disability analysis. It therefore concluded that a remand was not appropriate.

Disposition

The court denied Camie P.’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Acting Commissioner of Social Security Nancy A. Berryhill’s motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court ordered judgment to be entered accordingly.