Colvin v. Parker's Lake Apt

Background

Brenda Calloway Colvin applied for an apartment at Parkers Lake Apartments in March 2018. She told the apartment manager that she had credit concerns and was trying to expunge a prior eviction. The apartment’s screening software recommended denying her application because the eviction appeared in her housing records. A regional vice president of Timberland Partners reviewed the application and denied it because the eviction still appeared in her background.

Colvin reapplied in May 2018 after expunging the eviction. Parkers Lake approved her for Unit 1112, a refurbished three-bedroom apartment, and entered into a nine-month lease with her. Colvin later complained about refrigerator problems. The defendants’ records showed responses to those complaints, and the refrigerator was replaced in March 2019.

In January 2019, Parkers Lake required Colvin to pay future rent by money order, cashier’s check, or another approved method, stating that two of her rent checks had been returned for insufficient funds. The defendants then brought an eviction proceeding in Minnesota state court, claiming that Colvin owed $7,502.67 in rent, fees, and other charges. The state court entered judgment for Parkers Lake on May 20, 2019, and stayed issuance of a recovery writ until May 27, 2019. The opinion states that Colvin’s eviction was in progress on June 27, 2019.

Colvin filed this federal lawsuit on April 16, 2019. Her second amended complaint alleged that Parkers Lake violated the Fair Housing Act by treating her differently because of race and family status. She also filed motions seeking injunctive relief, permission to amend her preliminary-injunction motion, and a hearing on default judgment.

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation and Objections

Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz recommended denying Colvin’s two requests for injunctive relief, her motion to amend the preliminary-injunction motion, and her motion to schedule a default-judgment hearing. He found that Colvin had shown a threat of irreparable harm but had not shown a likelihood of success on her Fair Housing Act claim. He also found that the defendants had responded to her final amended pleading, so a default-judgment hearing was not warranted. The proposed amendment concerned numbering and was a minor issue that did not require correction.

Colvin objected that the magistrate judge failed to consider alternatives to eviction, public funding for the apartment, her mental illness, and the timing of the refrigerator repairs. The district court reviewed the objections to the injunction motions independently, as required for specific objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendation on dispositive motions.

Court’s Analysis

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy. The court explained that a party seeking one must show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a threat of irreparable harm; (3) that the balance of harms favors relief; and (4) that relief would serve the public interest. The court stated that these factors do not require consideration of other methods of resolving the dispute, such as a payment plan.

The court found that the public-interest factor was neutral. Tenants have an important public interest in fair housing, while landlords have an important public interest in enforcing leases and housing orders. The court also found that Colvin had already satisfied the irreparable-harm factor because eviction constituted the relevant harm.

The court rejected Colvin’s argument that her mental health established a Fair Housing Act disability-discrimination claim. Her complaint identified race and family status as the bases of the alleged discrimination. Although the complaint mentioned a mental and emotional breakdown and a therapy dog, it did not allege that the defendants discriminated against her because of a mental disability. The court therefore considered only the race- and family-status theories presented in the complaint.

Applying the framework used for disparate-treatment claims, the court found no direct evidence of discrimination and no showing that Colvin met the requirements for an initial race-discrimination case. The record indicated that the initial application denial was based on the eviction record, that the defendants rented to Colvin after the record was expunged, and that there was no evidence of different treatment of similarly situated people outside her protected class. The court also found no evidence that the higher rent resulted from discrimination rather than the apartment’s refurbishment and availability date.

The court further found no evidence that the defendants treated Colvin differently regarding her refrigerator complaints or retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Because Colvin had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the court concluded that she was not entitled to injunctive relief and did not need to analyze the remaining injunction factors.

Disposition

The court overruled Colvin’s objections and adopted the Report and Recommendation. It denied her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, denied her Motion to Amend the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, denied her Motion to Schedule a Hearing of Default Judgment, and denied her Motion for an Order of Injunction. The opinion did not enter a final ruling on the underlying Fair Housing Act claims; it addressed whether Colvin was entitled to the requested relief at that stage of the case.