Daniel A. v. Saul
- Elizabeth Wright
- 0:17-cv-04322
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 28
In Daniel A. v. Saul, Judge Wright denied Daniel A.’s motion, granted Saul’s cross-motion, and dismissed the disability-benefits case with prejudice.
Daniel A.’s claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits was rejected, and the Commissioner’s denial of benefits was upheld. The case was dismissed with prejudice.
What happened
In Daniel A. v. Saul, Daniel A. asked the court to review the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits. He claimed that back and neck problems prevented him from working. He represented himself in the federal case, although he had a lawyer at his administrative hearing.
The court concluded that the administrative law judge reasonably found Daniel A.’s neck condition was not severe before his insured status ended on December 31, 2011. The court also upheld the assessment of his back-related work capacity and the finding that he could perform his past jobs as a telemarketer and phone order clerk.
Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright denied Daniel A.’s motion for summary judgment, granted the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
The detailed version
- Daniel A. v. Saul · No. 0:17-cv-04322
- Elizabeth Wright
- Sept. 11, 2019
Background
Daniel A. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. He alleged disability beginning March 1, 2011, based primarily on back and neck problems. His insured status lasted through December 31, 2011, so he had to show that he was disabled during that period and that the disability lasted at least twelve months.
An administrative law judge found that Daniel A. had severe asthma and lumbar degenerative disc disease during the insured period. The administrative law judge found that his neck condition was not a severe impairment during that period. The administrative law judge determined that Daniel A. could perform light work with limits on bending, stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, climbing, and exposure to air pollutants. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the administrative law judge found that Daniel A. could perform his past work as a telemarketer and phone order clerk and therefore was not disabled.
Daniel A. moved for summary judgment, and the Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Daniel A. argued that the administrative law judge improperly evaluated his neck condition, discounted opinions from physician’s assistant Matthew Luther, failed to account for the continuing effects of his back condition, and wrongly found that he could perform his past work.
Court’s Analysis
The court reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision and whether the administrative law judge made a legal error. Substantial evidence means enough evidence that a reasonable person could accept it as supporting the conclusion.
The court held that substantial evidence supported the finding that Daniel A.’s neck problems were not a severe impairment before December 31, 2011. The record showed that he first sought medical care for neck pain in April 2012. The court also noted that Daniel A. later described his neck pain as beginning in 2012, and that Luther did not identify a disabling neck condition until November 2012.
The court found no error in the administrative law judge’s treatment of Luther’s opinions that Daniel A. could not work. For applications filed before March 27, 2017, the regulations treated physician’s assistants as medical sources who were not “acceptable medical sources” and therefore did not give them the same deference as treating physicians. The court also explained that an opinion stating that a claimant is unable to work addresses the ultimate disability decision reserved for the Commissioner and is not entitled to controlling weight or special significance.
The court further held that substantial evidence supported the residual functional capacity finding for Daniel A.’s back condition. Although he underwent two lumbar surgeries in 2011, medical records from December 2011 stated that he was doing well, denied pain and neurological symptoms, had normal strength and sensation, and could increase his activities as tolerated. The court determined that the temporary post-surgery restrictions did not establish a disabling impairment lasting twelve months.
Finally, the court upheld the finding that Daniel A. could perform his past relevant work. The vocational expert testified that a person with the limitations included in the administrative law judge’s hypothetical could perform the telemarketer and phone order clerk positions. The court rejected Daniel A.’s argument that the hypothetical should have included a need to rest or leave his work area for 15 percent of the day because the administrative law judge did not find those limitations supported by the record.
Disposition
The court denied Daniel A.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
Read the full 28-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.