Jerome S. v. Saul

Background

Jerome S. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying his application for supplemental security income under Title XVI. He alleged disability from bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, spina bifida, knee arthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, depression, anxiety, high blood pressure, sciatica, and acid reflux. He later changed his alleged disability-onset date to July 29, 2015 and withdrew his separate application for disability insurance benefits under Title II.

An administrative law judge held a hearing on July 16, 2018, at which Jerome S. was represented by an attorney. The administrative law judge found that Jerome S. had several severe physical and mental impairments but did not meet or equal a listed impairment. The judge determined that he could perform light work with additional physical and mental restrictions, including simple, routine, repetitive tasks; no production-rate work; limited interaction with coworkers and the public; and no operation of a motor vehicle or exposure to moving mechanical parts.

The administrative law judge found that Jerome S. could not perform his past relevant work but could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Based on vocational-expert testimony, the judge identified housekeeper, food service worker, and mail clerk as representative occupations. The administrative law judge therefore found Jerome S. not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, making that decision the Commissioner’s final decision.

Arguments and Analysis

Jerome S. filed a motion for summary judgment, and the Commissioner filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The court reviewed whether substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision and whether the administrative law judge made an error of law.

Opinions from treating sources. Jerome S. argued that the administrative law judge improperly discounted opinions from Tyler Bridge, MD, and Ken Becker, MA, LADC, LPCC, that he could not work. The court upheld the decision to give those opinions little weight. Dr. Bridge’s statement that Jerome S. could not work was inconsistent with treatment notes showing normal range of motion, no tenderness, and no deformities, as well as a later statement that Jerome S. could work at a job allowing frequent opportunities to sit. The court also noted that Dr. Bridge’s checked-box opinion did not identify objective medical evidence supporting the conclusion.

The court likewise upheld the discounting of Mr. Becker’s opinion. The court found that the opinion was inconsistent with Mr. Becker’s own treatment notes and with other mental-status examinations showing, among other things, orientation, coherent or logical thought processes, and no suicidal or homicidal ideation. The opinion also lacked a narrative explanation for the conclusion that Jerome S. could not perform any employment. In addition, opinions that a claimant is disabled or unable to work do not receive special significance because the ultimate disability decision belongs to the Commissioner. Decisions by other government agencies were also not binding on the Commissioner.

Post-traumatic stress disorder. Jerome S. argued that the administrative law judge failed to mention his post-traumatic stress disorder. The court treated the argument primarily as a challenge to the residual functional capacity, meaning the most a person can still do despite physical and mental limitations. Although the administrative law judge did not mention post-traumatic stress disorder by name, the court found that the judge considered records containing that diagnosis and included mental limitations supported by the record, including restrictions on task complexity, pace, decision-making, and interaction with others.

The court alternatively considered whether the administrative law judge erred by not deciding whether post-traumatic stress disorder was a severe impairment at the second step of the disability analysis. The court concluded that any such error was harmless because the administrative law judge considered the relevant functional effects when determining the residual functional capacity. Jerome S. did not identify any additional limitation that should have been included or explain how the result would have changed.

Other residual-functional-capacity arguments. Jerome S. argued that the administrative law judge failed to account for medication side effects, his inability to operate equipment or vehicles, and limits on his ability to sit, stand, and concentrate. The court found that the administrative law judge considered his testimony about medication side effects and reasonably found it inconsistent with other evidence, including reports that his medications were helpful or did not cause side effects. The residual functional capacity already prohibited operating a motor vehicle and exposure to moving mechanical parts.

The court also found substantial evidence supporting the administrative law judge’s evaluation of Jerome S.’s testimony about sitting, standing, walking, lifting, and concentration. The administrative law judge considered the testimony and medical records, and included physical and mental restrictions in the residual functional capacity. The court stated that it could not reweigh the evidence under the deferential substantial-evidence standard.

Ability to perform other work. Jerome S. challenged the vocational expert’s conclusion that a person with his residual functional capacity could perform the identified jobs. The court held that the hypothetical question to the vocational expert was supported by substantial evidence and included the impairments and limitations established in the record. The court therefore concluded that the administrative law judge could rely on the vocational expert’s testimony.

Disposition

The court ordered that Jerome S.’s motion for summary judgment was denied, the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment was granted, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. The order was signed by United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright.