Terry D. v. Saul

Background

Terry D. sought judicial review of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. She alleged disability beginning January 1, 2009, and her last insured date was December 31, 2013. Administrative Law Judge Micah Pharris found that she had several severe impairments, including chronic pelvic pain, right foot degenerative joint disease, right knee bursitis, left wrist degenerative joint disease, and chronic back pain.

The administrative judge determined that Terry D. could perform medium work, subject to limits involving right-foot controls, use of her left hand, and climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling. Because she could not return to her past work as a hand packager, the administrative judge relied on vocational-expert testimony that she could perform jobs such as warehouse worker, laundry worker, and hospital cleaner. The administrative judge therefore found her not disabled.

Issues

Terry D. challenged the administrative judge’s assessment of her work capacity, including the effect of her cane use, falls, wrist problems, pain medication, and other medical evidence. She also argued that the administrative judge improperly discounted the opinions of her treating physician, Sean E. Anderson, M.D. Finally, she alleged that the administrative judge was biased.

Court’s analysis

The court applied the substantial-evidence standard, which asks whether enough evidence supports the administrative decision that a reasonable person could accept it. The court held that the record supported the finding that Terry D. did not require a standing limitation based on cane use. The medical records mentioned cane use only twice before the last insured date and repeatedly recorded normal gait and station. The court also found that the documented falls and medical findings did not require additional standing restrictions.

The court likewise held that substantial evidence supported the lifting assessment. Although Terry D. reported wrist pain and continued brace use, imaging and nerve testing were largely normal, and an orthopedic physician was not confident that the wrist finding was causing her symptoms. The court also concluded that her use of Vicodin for several different complaints, often described as short-term treatment, did not require reversing the administrative judge’s work-capacity finding.

The court found that the administrative judge gave good reasons for assigning little weight to Dr. Anderson’s opinions that Terry D. was limited to sedentary or less-than-sedentary work. Those opinions were inconsistent with repeated normal gait findings, normal imaging, conservative treatment, and Terry D.’s activities and work history. The court also noted that Dr. Anderson testified that his conclusions relied substantially on Terry D.’s reported symptoms and that he was not qualified to diagnose fibromyalgia or determine that it existed before the last insured date.

The court rejected the bias claim. It found no bias in the administrative judge’s request for the recording of an interview, decision to obtain Dr. Anderson’s testimony, preference for in-person testimony, questioning of Dr. Anderson, or interruptions and tone during the hearings. The court stated that Terry D. had not shown conduct so extreme that the administrative judge could not fairly decide the case.

Disposition

The court denied Terry D.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright directed that judgment be entered accordingly.