Charnesky v. Piper

Background

This was the second round of motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 in Jill Charnesky’s case concerning her relationship with Olmsted County child-protection services and her son, B.C. After an earlier order, only claims that Charnesky brought on her own behalf against the Olmsted County Defendants remained. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to all remaining claims.

Charnesky alleged that a false child-protection petition was filed after B.C. experienced a serious medication error while receiving care at the Mayo Clinic. She alleged that B.C. was taken into custody, placed in foster care, later sent to a juvenile correctional facility, and assaulted there. She also alleged that county officials failed to inform a state-court judge about the assault, limited her contact with B.C., threatened her, and took other actions connected to B.C.’s placement and the child-protection proceedings.

Claims and legal standards

Four claims remained: a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of substantive due process based on B.C.’s removal from Charnesky’s home; a civil-rights conspiracy claim; a claim that the defendants retaliated against her under the Americans with Disabilities Act; and a § 1983 claim alleging prosecutorial misconduct against Mark Ostrem and Michelle Barnes. The court treated the motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) under the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court accepted the complaint’s factual allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in Charnesky’s favor, but required the allegations to make a plausible claim for relief.

Immunity rulings

The court held that claims concerning the initiation or litigation of the state-court child-protection case were barred by absolute immunity. It held that Ostrem, the Olmsted County Attorney, and Barnes, an Assistant Olmsted County Attorney, were protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity for conduct performed in their prosecutorial roles. That included Ostrem’s courtroom conduct at a guardianship proceeding and Barnes’s alleged failure to produce medical evidence relevant to that proceeding.

The court also held that, to the extent the claims alleged that social workers Jennifer Still, Kim Pease, or Marissa Gagnon initiated or maintained the child-protection petition using false information, those actions were protected by absolute immunity because the roles were functionally comparable to those of prosecutors. To the extent they were accused of giving false testimony in the proceedings, the court held that witness immunity applied.

Pleading rulings

The court dismissed Count VI, the civil-rights-conspiracy claim, in its entirety. It found that Charnesky had not alleged enough facts to suggest that the Olmsted County Defendants reached an agreement to deprive her of a right.

The court also found that most of Charnesky’s allegations concerning fund allocation and the profitability of foster placements, B.C.’s placement in the juvenile correctional facility, the failure to tell the state-court judge about B.C.’s assault, and the training or supervision of social workers did not plausibly show a violation of Charnesky’s own rights. The court emphasized that these allegations primarily concerned B.C. and did not explain how the alleged conduct affected Charnesky.

The court found that the Americans with Disabilities Act retaliation claim was not plausibly pleaded. Charnesky identified reports to a teacher and a state-court judge about assaults involving B.C., but did not connect those reports to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court therefore concluded that the reports were not adequately alleged to be legally protected activity. Nevertheless, because the defendants had not specifically addressed this pleading deficiency and Charnesky’s allegations suggested that she advocated for B.C., the court allowed her to file and serve an amended complaint addressing the disability-retaliation claim within 30 days.

Other motion and order

Charnesky had previously moved for the judge’s recusal, and that motion had been denied. She then filed a motion to appeal or reconsider that ruling. The court denied the new motion because she had not obtained the required permission to seek reconsideration, had not shown compelling circumstances, and presented no new evidence or argument. The court also ordered that the stay of discovery remain in effect.

Disposition

The order granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, kept the discovery stay in place, denied Charnesky’s motion to appeal or reconsider the earlier recusal ruling, and allowed her to file an amended complaint addressing the deficiencies in the Americans with Disabilities Act retaliation claim.