Gruenwald v. Toro Company, The

Background

Scott Gruenwald and William Brooks each purchased a 2014 Toro TimeCutter riding lawnmower. Gruenwald alleged that his mower caught fire in 2018 and that the fire ultimately engulfed his home. Brooks alleged that his mower caught fire in July 2019 after he returned it to a shed; he extinguished the fire, and the complaint did not indicate that property other than the mower was damaged.

The plaintiffs alleged that 2014 TimeCutter mowers, like approximately 9,000 recalled 2015 models, were defectively designed and prone to catching fire. They alleged that Toro knew of the defects but did not recall the 2014 models or notify owners. Each plaintiff sought to represent a class of people in the United States who purchased or acquired a 2014 or 2015 Toro TimeCutter primarily for household purposes.

They asserted claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, negligence, unjust enrichment, strict products liability based on design defect and failure to warn, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Toro moved to dismiss claims, sought summary judgment on each plaintiff’s warranty claim, and moved to strike the class allegations.

Choice of Law

For Gruenwald’s implied-warranty claim, the court noted that Illinois law generally requires a direct contractual relationship between the buyer and manufacturer for an implied-warranty claim involving only economic loss, while Minnesota law extends warranties to certain reasonably expected users. The court found that Gruenwald might be able to plead facts showing the required relationship through Toro’s express warranty. It therefore dismissed his implied-warranty claim without prejudice and did not conduct a choice-of-law analysis for that claim.

For Brooks’s implied-warranty claim, the court found an outcome-determinative conflict between North Carolina and Minnesota law. Applying Minnesota’s choice-of-law factors, the court selected North Carolina law because Brooks bought and used the mower there and the fire occurred there. North Carolina law limited the relevant warranties to three years after purchase. Because Brooks bought the mower in June 2014 and the fire occurred in July 2019, and because his submission did not show that further discovery could affect the warranty time limits, the court granted summary judgment to Toro on Brooks’s warranty claim.

The court also applied Illinois law to Gruenwald’s strict-liability claims and North Carolina law to Brooks’s strict-liability claims. It dismissed Gruenwald’s strict-liability failure-to-warn claim with prejudice because Illinois did not recognize that claim. The court declined to dismiss Gruenwald’s strict-liability design-defect claim at the pleading stage because he could not be expected to know the precise defect before discovery. Brooks conceded that North Carolina law governed his strict-liability claims, and the court dismissed those claims with prejudice under North Carolina’s prohibition on such claims.

Other Claims

The plaintiffs conceded that their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were not appropriate. The court dismissed those claims with prejudice.

The court allowed both unjust-enrichment claims to proceed because, at this early stage, the plaintiffs could pursue unjust enrichment as an alternative theory even though they also sought legal remedies.

The court denied Toro’s request to dismiss Gruenwald’s negligence claim. It concluded that Gruenwald could not be expected to identify the exact mower defect before discovery. The court dismissed Brooks’s negligence claim without prejudice because his complaint alleged no damage to property other than the mower, and Toro argued that North Carolina’s economic-loss rule barred the claim.

Class Allegations and Disposition

The court denied as premature Toro’s motion to strike the class allegations.

The motion to dismiss in No. 19-2294 was granted in part and denied in part. Gruenwald’s implied-warranty claim was dismissed without prejudice; his strict-liability failure-to-warn and injunctive and declaratory-relief claims were dismissed with prejudice; and his strict-liability design-defect, negligence, and unjust-enrichment claims remained pending.

The motion to dismiss in No. 19-2345 was granted in part and denied in part. Brooks’s breach-of-implied-warranty and strict-liability claims, along with his injunctive and declaratory-relief claims, were dismissed with prejudice. His negligence claim was dismissed without prejudice, while his unjust-enrichment claim remained pending. Judge Paul A. Magnuson also entered summary judgment against Brooks on his warranty claim.