Fofana v. Mayorkas

Background

Abrahim Fofana, a citizen and native of Liberia, arrived in the United States in 2001 and applied for asylum. In his application, affidavit, and testimony before an immigration judge, he described his membership in the Liberian Student Organization and its fundraising connected to the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, or ULIMO. The immigration judge granted asylum after the United States said it would not oppose the grant.

Fofana later applied to adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent resident. After more than twelve years without a decision, he filed an action to compel a decision. While that action was pending, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services issued a notice stating that Fofana might be inadmissible because his support for ULIMO constituted terrorist activity. USCIS then denied his adjustment application on that basis.

Fofana filed this case under the Administrative Procedure Act and sought a declaration that USCIS was barred from finding him inadmissible based on the evidence from his asylum proceeding. He also sought a declaration that he had not engaged in terrorist activity. Both sides moved for summary judgment, which is a decision entered when the material facts are not genuinely disputed and one side is entitled to judgment under the law.

Issues

The court identified two main questions: whether issue preclusion, also called collateral estoppel, applied to an adjustment-of-status decision after an earlier asylum grant; and, if it applied, whether the government was barred from reconsidering Fofana’s admissibility based on his association with ULIMO.

Issue preclusion generally prevents a party from relitigating an issue of fact or law that was actually litigated, finally decided, and essential to an earlier judgment.

Court’s reasoning

The court held that Congress had not expressly or implicitly excluded adjustment-of-status applications from ordinary issue-preclusion rules. The adjustment statute relies on an earlier asylum grant and requires an admissibility determination at the time of the adjustment examination. In the court’s view, this allowed USCIS to consider later developments but did not allow it to relitigate issues already decided in the asylum proceeding.

The court also rejected the government’s argument that amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act had materially changed the legal standards governing terrorism-related inadmissibility. The court concluded that the relevant amendments did not create a sufficiently different standard to prevent issue preclusion from applying.

The court further held that Fofana’s admissibility had been actually litigated. Because inadmissibility would have completely barred asylum, the immigration judge necessarily determined that Fofana was admissible when granting asylum. The court reasoned that the government could not avoid preclusion simply by failing to discuss admissibility at the earlier hearing and then relying on the same record years later.

Finally, the court concluded that the legal standards for terrorism-related inadmissibility were not significantly different from those in effect when Fofana’s asylum application was granted. The government therefore was collaterally estopped from finding Fofana inadmissible because of his association with ULIMO.

Disposition

The court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The order did not state that USCIS was required to approve Fofana’s application for lawful permanent resident status; it ruled that the government could not use his association with ULIMO as the basis for finding him inadmissible in this proceeding.

Judge John R. Tunheim signed the memorandum opinion and order and directed that judgment be entered accordingly.