LeMay v. Mays

Background

Jennifer L.M. LeMay, personally and as guardian of C.L.E. and V.E., and Courtney J. Livingston sued Michael B. Mays and the City of Minneapolis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 allows a person to seek relief for the violation of federal constitutional rights by someone acting under state law.

The plaintiffs alleged that Mays, a Minneapolis Police Department officer, entered the backyard of their home while responding to an accidentally triggered burglar alarm. They alleged that Ciroc walked toward Mays while wagging his tail in a friendly manner, and that Mays shot Ciroc in the face. They further alleged that Rocko later approached Mays in a non-threatening manner, after which Mays shot Rocko multiple times. Both dogs survived but were severely injured and permanently disabled, and the plaintiffs alleged that they no longer performed their service-animal tasks.

The amended complaint asserted three claims: Count I against Mays for an allegedly illegal search of the home; Count II against Mays for an allegedly illegal seizure of the dogs; and Count III against the City for municipal liability based on Mays’s conduct. The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The motion sought dismissal of Counts II and III.

Count II: Claim Against Mays

The Fourth Amendment treats dogs as property and protects owners against unreasonable seizures of that property. The court explained that shooting a dog meaningfully interferes with the owner’s possessory interest, so the key question was whether the seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court was required to treat the complaint’s factual allegations as true. The plaintiffs alleged that Ciroc and Rocko acted in friendly or non-threatening ways and did not pose an immediate threat. The court concluded that these allegations were sufficient to allow the dog-seizure claim to proceed. The court also declined to consider the defendants’ selected materials outside the complaint, including police reports and video, as a basis for converting the motion into a summary-judgment ruling.

The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss as to Count II. This ruling addressed the sufficiency of the allegations at that stage; it did not finally decide whether Mays’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

Count III: Claim Against the City

A municipality can be liable under § 1983 when a constitutional violation results from an official policy, an unofficial custom, or inadequate training. The plaintiffs’ allegations fit, if at all, an inadequate-training theory. To state such a claim, they needed facts supporting the conclusion that the City had notice of the alleged problem and acted with deliberate indifference—meaning a serious disregard of a known or plainly obvious risk to constitutional rights.

The court found that the complaint did not provide specific facts supporting its allegations that Minneapolis officers routinely misidentified friendly dogs as threats or routinely used excessive force against dogs. Because the complaint lacked facts showing the City had notice of that alleged pattern, it failed to state a municipal-liability claim.

The court granted the motion to dismiss as to Count III and dismissed Count III without prejudice. The plaintiffs were allowed 45 days from the date of the order to file an amended complaint if specific supporting facts existed.

Disposition

The court ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Count III was dismissed without prejudice, and the plaintiffs were given 45 days to file an amended complaint. The opinion did not dismiss Count II.