Malark v. RBC Capital Markets, LLC

Background

Maria Malark worked for RBC from 2000 until RBC terminated her employment in October 2017. She had served as Director of Operations for U.S. Wealth Management and overseen approximately 350 employees. The record included positive performance reviews, increased responsibilities, employee complaints about her behavior and interactions, executive coaching, and evidence concerning RBC’s 2017 cultural-transformation initiative and leadership model.

In early 2017, Malark’s daughter experienced serious mental-health problems, including anxiety, depression, suicidal behavior, and inpatient treatment. Malark told RBC personnel that she needed time away from work and was missing work intermittently to care for her daughter. RBC later sent her Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) materials, but Malark did not complete or return the paperwork. RBC terminated her employment on October 5, 2017, and replaced her with Greg Schwab, a male employee whom the record showed had limited operations experience.

Malark asserted nine claims: FMLA entitlement and discrimination claims; sex-discrimination and sex-plus-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Minnesota Human Rights Act; an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) associational-disability claim; a Minnesota Human Rights Act familial-status claim; and a Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal claim. RBC moved for summary judgment. Malark moved for partial summary judgment on the FMLA notice issue.

FMLA claims

The court held that Malark gave RBC legally sufficient notice of a possible need for FMLA leave. Her June 5 email described her daughter’s admission to an inpatient mental-health unit and stated that Malark would need time away from work. Her September 6 email stated that she was at the hospital with her daughter and would miss work. In her September 18 call with RBC’s leave representative, she discussed FMLA leave, intermittent absences, and her daughter’s health problems. The court held that each of these communications was sufficient as a matter of law, and that failing to complete the FMLA paperwork did not erase the notice she had already provided.

The court nevertheless rejected Malark’s FMLA entitlement claim. Such a claim required evidence that RBC refused to authorize leave or took action to avoid its FMLA responsibilities, including by actually discouraging Malark from using leave. The court found that no reasonable jury could conclude that the leave representative’s statements about the FMLA process actually deterred Malark. Malark understood the process, received the paperwork, was not prevented from completing it, was not threatened with punishment, and acknowledged that taking leave was her choice.

The court also rejected Malark’s FMLA discrimination claim. Notifying RBC that she intended to take FMLA leave was protected activity, and her termination was an adverse employment action. But the court found no sufficient evidence of causation. Malark first notified RBC of a possible need for FMLA leave on June 5, and RBC terminated her four months later. Under the cited Eighth Circuit precedent, that gap was too long, without additional evidence, to support a causal connection.

Sex discrimination

The court denied summary judgment on Malark’s sex-discrimination claims under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. RBC offered a legitimate stated reason for the termination: Malark allegedly did not meet the criteria of the new leadership model. But the court found evidence from which a reasonable jury could decide that this reason was pretext, meaning a cover for unlawful discrimination.

The evidence included Malark’s consistently positive performance reviews, increased responsibilities, improved employee-survey results, ranking in the second quartile of RBC managers, and Versnel’s recent statement that Malark was living up to the new leadership model. The record also contained conflicting evidence about the timing of the termination decision, whether Malark was considered for other positions, the consistency of Versnel’s testimony, and the absence of documentation showing how Malark had been assessed under the new leadership model. A reasonable jury also could find that Schwab was less qualified for the role because he lacked extensive operations experience, had stated that he did not know much about operations, and had not passed a required licensing examination after two attempts.

Other discrimination and reprisal claims

The court granted summary judgment on Malark’s sex-plus discrimination claims under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Those claims were based on her status as a woman with children. The court found that the timing of her termination while she was caring for her daughter, additional responsibilities, and increased scrutiny did not establish the required discriminatory connection. Malark also did not identify evidence that the decisionmakers knew Schwab was a father or treated comparable male employees with children differently.

The court granted summary judgment on Malark’s Minnesota Human Rights Act familial-status claim because it rested on the same facts as her sex-plus claims. It also granted summary judgment on her ADA associational-disability claim and Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal claim. Malark relied primarily on the timing between RBC learning of her daughter’s health condition on June 5 and her termination four months later. The court held that this interval was too long to support a reasonable inference of discrimination or retaliation.

Disposition

Judge Tostrud ordered that Malark’s motion for partial summary judgment was granted. The court ordered that RBC Wealth Management’s motion for summary judgment was granted as to Malark’s FMLA entitlement and discrimination claims, Title VII and Minnesota Human Rights Act sex-plus claims, Minnesota Human Rights Act familial-status claim, ADA associational-disability claim, and Minnesota Human Rights Act reprisal claim. The court ordered that RBC’s motion was denied as to Malark’s Title VII and Minnesota Human Rights Act sex-discrimination claims.