Mason v. Johnston

Background

Ricky Mason, proceeding without a lawyer, is civilly committed at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program facility in Moose Lake, Minnesota. The program permits clients to receive visits and use telephones subject to its policies.

Mason wanted to visit and speak with Cara Lea Keinanen, a former MSOP employee. He described Keinanen as an important support person who helped him remain grounded, helped his mother understand his situation, and encouraged him during treatment. After waiting one year following Keinanen’s separation from MSOP employment, Mason requested a visit in July 2017. The request was denied because of stated “security issues.”

Kevin Moser, the facility director, told Mason that Keinanen’s denied status would continue. Moser also approved notices blocking Keinanen’s telephone number for one year. The notices cited interference with Mason’s therapeutic treatment process. Mason received additional telephone-block notices, and Blake Carey and Randy Gordon later approved a Behavioral Expectations Report stating that Mason had violated the client telephone-use policy by calling a former MSOP staff member. The report led to restrictions on Mason’s room placement, off-unit activities, and contact visits.

MSOP later allowed Mason and Keinanen to speak by telephone again, but blocked her number once more in February 2019. Mason filed several grievances. Moser said there were ongoing concerns about his contact with former staff and later stated that Mason had been involved in an inappropriate relationship with Keinanen. Nancy Johnston, MSOP’s chief executive officer, supported Moser’s authority to block the number, and Johnston and Jim Berg dismissed another grievance.

Procedural History

Mason filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute that allows claims against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state law. He alleged violations of the First Amendment right of association and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion as to Mason’s claims concerning association with Keinanen by telephone and contact visits, his procedural-due-process claim concerning the telephone policy, and his § 1983 claims against Carey and Gordon. The defendants objected.

The district court conducted a fresh review of the objected-to portions of the recommendation. It overruled the objections, adopted the recommendation, and denied in part and granted in part the motion to dismiss.

First Amendment Association Claim

The court explained that the First Amendment protects some close and personal relationships. Because Mason described Keinanen as a singular and important support person with whom he had communicated for years, the court found that he plausibly alleged a protected relationship. Since MSOP allegedly prohibited telephone and visit contact with Keinanen, Mason plausibly stated a claim that defendants violated his freedom of association.

The defendants argued that Mason’s civil commitment meant he had no protected right of association, but the court rejected that argument at this stage. The court also declined to apply a test concerning whether institutional rules are reasonably related to legitimate therapeutic or institutional interests because the record did not contain enough detail about the policies or the interests supporting the restrictions.

Earlier Class Action and Issue Preclusion

The defendants argued that Mason was barred from litigating these issues because he had been part of an earlier class action challenging MSOP policies. The court explained that issue preclusion can prevent relitigation of an issue already decided in a prior case when specific requirements are met.

The court concluded that the earlier case had addressed the policies as applied to the class as a whole, not their constitutionality as applied to individual people. Because Mason challenged how the policies were applied to him personally, the court held that he was not barred from asserting these claims.

Procedural Due Process Claim

A procedural due process claim requires a protected liberty or property interest and then asks what procedures were required before that interest could be taken away. The court held that Mason’s plausibly protected freedom of association satisfied the first step.

The court said it could not fully determine the required procedures because the record lacked sufficient details about MSOP’s telephone-use policy, how officials generally applied it, and whether Mason’s grievances received proper consideration. Nevertheless, the court found that Mason alleged enough facts to plausibly infer that defendants failed to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court therefore allowed the procedural due process claim to proceed at this stage.

Claims Against Carey and Gordon

To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant was personally involved in, or responsible for, the constitutional violation. Mason alleged that Carey and Gordon signed and approved the Behavioral Expectations Report issued because he called Keinanen. He also alleged that the report resulted in restrictions that curtailed his contact with her.

The court held that these allegations plausibly connected Carey and Gordon to the alleged constitutional violations and allowed Mason’s § 1983 claims against them to proceed at this stage.

Order

The court overruled the defendants’ objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s July 22, 2020 Report and Recommendation, and denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The opinion’s final order does not identify which other claims or portions of the motion were granted.