Fredin v. Middlecamp

Background

The order addressed motions in three related cases: Fredin’s cases against Lindsey Middlecamp, Grace Elizabeth Miller and Catherine Marie Schaefer, and Jamie Kreil. Fredin represented himself. Defendants asked the court to stop him from publishing websites and videos disparaging attorneys, judges, jurors, and court personnel involved in his litigation. They also asked the court to declare Fredin a vexatious litigant, meaning a litigant whose abusive filing practices justify restrictions on future lawsuits. Kreil separately sought sanctions, dismissal of Fredin’s case against her, and attorneys’ fees. Fredin filed cross-motions seeking sanctions against Defendants and their counsel.

The court described evidence of numerous websites, videos, threats, and inflammatory court filings. It found that Fredin had used online postings to attack opposing counsel and judicial personnel, threaten retaliation for unfavorable rulings, and pressure Middlecamp, Miller, and Schaefer to agree to favorable settlements. Fredin did not deny responsibility for the identified websites and videos and stated that they would not be removed.

Injunction and inherent authority

The court granted Defendants’ motions for a preliminary injunction, but explained that the relief was actually an injunction issued under the court’s inherent authority to sanction serious abuses of the judicial process. The court concluded that the ordinary preliminary-injunction framework was not a good fit because Defendants’ requested relief concerned misconduct connected to the litigation rather than the merits of Fredin’s underlying claims. The court also found that the Federal Rules’ sanctions procedures were inadequate for conduct occurring largely outside court filings and discovery.

The injunction required Fredin immediately to remove, or cause to be removed, 25 specifically identified websites and videos targeting Defendants’ counsel or Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer so that they were not publicly accessible. It also required removal of other publicly accessible online material substantially similar to the identified material. The court did not order removal of websites targeting participants in Fredin’s state-court litigation, but included websites targeting Defendants’ prior counsel because the court found they could affect Defendants’ ability to retain counsel.

The injunction prohibited Fredin, himself or through a third party, from reposting the identified material or posting additional substantially similar accusations against Defendants, their counsel, or Magistrate Judge Bowbeer. It also prohibited additional publicly accessible online material targeting Defendants, their counsel, or any judge or court staff member involved in the litigation when the material constituted harassment under the definition in Minnesota Statutes section 609.748. The future restraints in those two categories expire five years after the order’s entry. The court warned that violating the injunction could result in dismissal of Fredin’s still-pending case against Kreil, contempt proceedings that might lead to detention, or another lawful penalty.

The court rejected Fredin’s arguments that Defendants lacked standing, that the court could not address conduct occurring outside court proceedings, and that the online postings were protected by the First Amendment. The court found that Defendants—not their counsel—filed the motions and sought protection from harm to themselves. It further found that the postings were part of bad-faith harassment and intimidation connected to the litigation.

Vexatious-litigant restriction

The court granted Defendants’ motions to declare Fredin a vexatious litigant. It found that his litigation history, overlapping lawsuits, threats, inflammatory filings, and online conduct demonstrated malicious and manifestly abusive use of the court process. Fredin was restricted from filing any new lawsuits in the District of Minnesota unless he was represented by an attorney or first obtained written approval from the Chief Judge. Any request for approval had to include a copy of this order.

Kreil’s sanctions motion

The court granted in part and denied in part Kreil’s motion for sanctions. It denied Kreil’s request to dismiss Fredin’s complaint against her as a sanction, finding that the injunction was an adequate remedy at that stage. The court warned that it could reconsider dismissal if Fredin engaged in additional bad-faith conduct toward Kreil or violated the injunction.

The court granted Kreil’s request for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing her sanctions motion. It found that Fredin had acted in bad faith and that his attacks on Kreil’s counsel and Magistrate Judge Bowbeer threatened the integrity of the judicial process. Kreil had to submit documentation of the fees within 14 days after the order, and Fredin had 14 days after service of that submission to respond.

Fredin’s sanctions motions

The court denied Fredin’s cross-motions for sanctions against Defendants and their counsel. It found merit in Defendants’ motions and found no evidence supporting Fredin’s claim that Defendants were attempting to destroy his life and career through the litigation.