Fredin v. Kreil

Background

The order addressed several motions in three related cases brought by Brock Fredin against Lindsey Middlecamp, Grace Elizabeth Miller, Catherine Marie Schaefer, and Jamie Kreil. Fredin represented himself. The defendants sought orders stopping Fredin from posting online websites and videos disparaging attorneys, judges, and court personnel involved in his litigation. The court had converted the temporary-restraining-order motions into motions for preliminary injunctions.

The defendants also asked the court to declare Fredin a vexatious litigant—a litigant whose abusive filing pattern justifies limits on access to the court—and to restrict his ability to file new lawsuits in the District of Minnesota. Kreil separately sought sanctions, including dismissal of Fredin’s case against her and attorneys’ fees. Fredin filed cross-motions seeking sanctions against the defendants and their counsel.

The court described numerous websites and videos attacking opposing lawyers, judges, jurors, and court staff. It found that Fredin had not denied responsibility for the identified websites and videos and had stated that they would not be taken down. The court also found that Fredin had used online postings to pressure Middlecamp, Miller, and Schaefer to agree to favorable settlements, and had threatened additional online attacks after unfavorable rulings. The order discussed Fredin’s litigation history, including twelve lawsuits in Minnesota and Wisconsin state and federal courts during the preceding three years, as well as prior findings by other courts concerning harassment through litigation.

Injunction and sanctions under the court’s inherent authority

The court concluded that the ordinary preliminary-injunction framework was not a good fit because the requested relief concerned conduct tangential to the underlying claims, rather than the likelihood that the defendants would prevail on those claims. Instead, the court relied on its inherent authority to sanction serious abuses of the judicial process. It found that the federal procedural rules did not adequately address Fredin’s largely out-of-court conduct.

The court held that Fredin’s online conduct was a sanctionable abuse of the judicial process. It rejected Fredin’s arguments that the defendants lacked standing to seek relief, that the court could not reach conduct occurring online, and that the First Amendment protected the postings. The court stated that the First Amendment did not entitle a litigant to use baseless, inflammatory, or sexually graphic attacks to harass opposing counsel or judicial officers into accepting favorable settlement terms or rulings.

The injunction required Fredin immediately to remove, or cause to be removed, specified websites and videos targeting defendants’ counsel or Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer, including substantially similar publicly accessible online material not specifically identified in the order. Fredin was prohibited from reposting the identified material or causing someone else to repost it. He was also prohibited from posting substantially similar accusations against the defendants, their counsel, or Magistrate Judge Bowbeer. These future-conduct restrictions expire five years after the order was entered.

The injunction further prohibited Fredin from posting or causing to be posted publicly accessible online material targeting the defendants, their counsel, or judges or court staff involved in the litigation when the material constituted harassment as defined by Minnesota Statutes § 609.748, subdivision 1. The court stated that the injunction would apply on the same terms to harassing material about any new counsel defendants retained in the litigation. The court did not order removal of websites targeting participants in Fredin’s state-court litigation, although it included websites targeting the defendants’ prior counsel.

Vexatious-litigant restriction

The court found Fredin’s conduct in the litigation unequivocally malicious and manifestly abusive. It therefore granted the defendants’ motions to declare him a vexatious litigant and restricted him from filing any new lawsuits in the District of Minnesota unless he was represented by an attorney or obtained prior written approval from the court’s chief judge. Fredin must include a copy of the order with any request for approval.

Kreil’s sanctions motion

The court granted in part and denied in part Kreil’s motion for sanctions. It denied Kreil’s request to dismiss Fredin’s complaint against her as a sanction, finding that the injunction was an adequate remedy at that stage. The court warned that it could reconsider dismissal if it learned of additional bad-faith conduct toward Kreil, including violations of the injunction.

The court granted Kreil’s request for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing her sanctions motion. It found that Fredin acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, and ordered Kreil to submit documentation of the fees. The order did not state the amount of the award. Kreil’s memorandum and declaration were due within fourteen days, and Fredin’s response was due within fourteen days after service of those materials.

Fredin’s cross-motions

The court denied Fredin’s cross-motions for sanctions against the defendants and their counsel. It found merit in the defendants’ motions and no evidence supporting Fredin’s assertion that the defendants were attempting to destroy his life and career through the litigation.

Disposition

Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted the defendants’ motions for a preliminary injunction, granted the motions to declare Fredin a vexatious litigant, granted in part and denied in part Kreil’s motion for sanctions and attorneys’ fees, and denied Fredin’s cross-motions for sanctions. The injunction warned that noncompliance could result in dismissal of Fredin’s still-pending lawsuit against Kreil, contempt proceedings that could result in detention, or another lawful penalty within the court’s contempt powers.