Fredin v. Miller

Background

Brock Fredin, representing himself, filed three related cases. In the first, he alleged that Lindsey Middlecamp defamed him on social media. In the second, he brought a similar action against Grace Elizabeth Miller and Catherine Marie Schaefer. In the third, he sued Jamie Kreil over defamation related to an affidavit Kreil submitted in the earlier litigation, among other claims.

The defendants identified more than twenty websites and videos attacking attorneys, judges, jurors, and court personnel involved in Fredin’s current and earlier litigation. The court described the material as inflammatory, baseless, demeaning, and disturbing. The defendants also presented evidence that Fredin used the online material to pressure Middlecamp, Miller, and Schaefer to agree to favorable settlements and had threatened additional postings in response to unfavorable rulings. Fredin did not deny responsibility for the websites and videos and stated that he would not take them down.

The court also considered Fredin’s litigation history. It found that he had generated twelve lawsuits in Minnesota and Wisconsin state and federal courts, along with numerous unsuccessful appeals, during the preceding three years. The court stated that other courts had found that Fredin used litigation to harass defendants and that one court had restricted his ability to file additional lawsuits against one of them.

Preliminary-injunction motions and online conduct

The defendants initially sought temporary restraining orders, which the court converted into motions for preliminary injunctions. The court concluded that the usual preliminary-injunction framework did not fit well because the defendants were not asking for relief on the merits of defamation claims based on Fredin’s online activity. Instead, they sought to stop conduct that was connected to, but separate from, the underlying claims.

The court therefore treated the requested injunction as a sanction under its inherent authority—the court’s power to address serious abuses of the judicial process. It found that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not adequately address Fredin’s misconduct because much of it occurred outside court filings and discovery. The court held that Fredin’s online attacks, threats, and attempts to use those postings to influence settlements and court decisions were sanctionable abuses of the judicial process.

The court rejected Fredin’s arguments that the defendants lacked standing, that the online conduct was beyond the court’s authority because it did not occur inside a courtroom, and that the postings were protected by the First Amendment. The court stated that the defendants themselves—not their lawyers—filed the motions to protect their interests, that the court’s authority reaches conduct outside the courtroom, and that the First Amendment did not protect the postings insofar as they were used to harass opposing counsel or judicial officers and pressure them to yield to Fredin’s demands.

Terms of the injunction

The court granted the defendants’ motions for a preliminary injunction, but issued the injunction under its inherent authority to sanction abuse of the judicial process rather than under the ordinary preliminary-injunction framework.

The injunction required Fredin immediately to remove, or cause to be removed, the websites and videos identified by the defendants that targeted their counsel or Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer, so the material would no longer be publicly accessible. It also required removal of other publicly accessible online media substantially similar to the identified material, even if not specifically listed in the order.

Fredin was prohibited from reposting, or causing a third party to repost, the identified material. He was also prohibited from posting or causing to be posted additional publicly accessible online media containing substantially similar accusations against the defendants, their counsel, or Magistrate Judge Bowbeer. Those restraints on future conduct expire five years after entry of the order.

The injunction further barred Fredin from posting or causing to be posted online media targeting the defendants, their counsel, or any judge or court staff member involved in the litigation when the material constituted harassment as defined by Minnesota Statutes § 609.748. The court stated that this provision would also apply to harassing material about any new counsel retained by the defendants, and that these future-conduct restraints also expire after five years.

The court declined to order removal of websites targeting participants in Fredin’s state-court litigation because those people were not before the court. It did include websites targeting the defendants’ prior counsel because the court found that such material could affect the defendants’ ability to retain counsel in the future. The court warned that violating the injunction could lead to dismissal of Fredin’s still-pending case against Kreil, contempt proceedings that could result in detention, or another lawful penalty.

Vexatious-litigant restrictions

The court granted the defendants’ motions to declare Fredin a vexatious litigant. It found that the volume and overlapping nature of his lawsuits, his statements about replacing dismissed lawsuits with new ones, his online attacks, and his conduct in the three cases demonstrated malicious and manifestly abusive litigation activity.

The order restricted Fredin from filing any new lawsuit in the District of Minnesota unless he was represented by an attorney or obtained prior written approval from the Chief Judge of that district. Any request for approval had to include a copy of this order.

Kreil’s sanctions and fee motion

The court granted in part and denied in part Jamie Kreil’s motion for sanctions. It denied Kreil’s request to dismiss Fredin’s complaint against her as a sanction, finding that the injunction was an adequate remedy at that stage. The court warned that it could reconsider dismissal if Fredin engaged in additional bad-faith conduct toward Kreil, including violating the injunction.

The court granted Kreil’s request for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing the sanctions motion. It ordered Kreil to submit documentation of those fees within fourteen days after entry of the order, and gave Fredin fourteen days after service of that submission to respond.

Fredin’s cross-motions

The court denied Fredin’s cross-motions for sanctions against the defendants and their counsel. It found merit in the defendants’ motions and found no evidence supporting Fredin’s assertion that the defendants were acting together to destroy his life and career through the litigation.

Disposition

Judge Susan Richard Nelson granted the defendants’ motions for a preliminary injunction and their motions to declare Fredin a vexatious litigant. The court granted in part and denied in part Kreil’s motion for sanctions and attorneys’ fees, denied Fredin’s cross-motions for sanctions, and did not dismiss Fredin’s case against Kreil.