Foster v. Litman
- Joan Ericksen
- 0:19-cv-00260
- U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
- 4
In Foster v. Phinney, Judge Ericksen granted summary judgment to Deputy Phinney and dismissed Foster’s due-process claims with prejudice.
Bradley W. Foster’s due-process claims were dismissed with prejudice, and Mark Phinney prevailed on his motion for summary judgment.
What happened
Bradley W. Foster sued Mark Phinney, a St. Louis County deputy sheriff, over alleged physical injuries. The court reviewed a magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant Phinney’s motion for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence shows a real dispute requiring a trial.
Foster objected, arguing that a county policy about restraints during transports of people under probate commitment applied to his transport. The court said the policy covered only the specific types of transport listed in the policy, and transport to or from court was not listed. Foster also argued that the recommendation failed to consider his evidence, but he identified no specific evidence that was overlooked.
Judge Ericksen conducted a fresh review, adopted the recommendation, and granted Phinney’s motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Foster’s due-process claims with prejudice and ordered judgment entered.
The detailed version
- Foster v. Litman · No. 0:19-cv-00260
- Joan Ericksen
- Mar. 5, 2021
Background
The court reviewed a report and recommendation issued by United States Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Cowan Wright. The recommendation advised granting Defendant Mark Phinney’s motion for summary judgment. Foster objected to that recommendation.
Foster argued that a provision in the St. Louis County Sheriff’s Policy on Prisoner Handling and Restraints applied to his case. The provision stated that transport deputies must assess the type and amount of restraints used for probate patients. The policy listed several specific kinds of probate-related transport, including transport under certain Minnesota commitment statutes.
Foster’s Objections
Foster contended that the recommendation wrongly concluded that he was not a probate patient. The court clarified that the recommendation did not make that finding. Instead, it concluded that the policy provision did not apply to transports of committed persons to or from court. Foster offered no evidence contradicting Phinney’s evidence that the provision applied only to the types of transport identified in the policy. The court also noted that, even if the provision applied, Foster did not explain how it would change the outcome of his claims.
Foster separately argued that the recommendation weighed the evidence in Phinney’s favor without considering Foster’s evidence. The court found that Foster identified no specific evidence that the recommendation failed to consider. His general reference to the allegations in his complaint did not establish specific facts creating a genuine issue for trial. The court explained that unsupported allegations and conclusions are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Ruling
After conducting a de novo review of the record, meaning an independent review of the disputed matters, Judge Ericksen adopted the report and recommendation and accepted its recommended disposition. The court granted Mark Phinney’s motion for summary judgment, dismissed Foster’s due-process claims with prejudice, and ordered judgment entered accordingly.
Read the full 4-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.