Karsjens v. Minnesota Department of Human Services

Background

The plaintiffs are individuals residing at the Minnesota Sex Offender Program who are civilly committed under Minnesota Statute § 253D. The fourteen named plaintiffs represent a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), consisting of patients currently civilly committed to the program under Minnesota Statute § 253B.

The lawsuit challenges the constitutionality of Minnesota’s civil-commitment law and several aspects of the program’s operation. The relevant remaining claims were Counts V, VI, and VII. Count V alleged that the defendants denied plaintiffs’ constitutional right to be free from punishment. Count VI alleged that the defendants denied a constitutional right to less restrictive alternative confinement. Count VII alleged that the defendants subjected plaintiffs to inhumane treatment. The opinion states that these claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment and concern policies and conditions at the program.

The case had previously gone through a bench trial and appeals. The district court had dismissed Counts V, VI, and VII under a legal standard concerning conduct that "shocks the conscience." In February 2021, the Eighth Circuit reversed that dismissal, concluding that the district court had applied the wrong standards. The appeals court directed that the inadequate-medical-care claim be considered under a deliberate-indifference standard and that the other conditions-of-confinement claims be considered under the standard for punitive conditions of confinement. The Eighth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Count III.

The Proposed Amendment

After the remand, plaintiffs moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b)(2) for leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint. That rule allows a pleading to be amended to match issues tried with the parties’ express or implied consent, including after judgment.

Plaintiffs argued that the amendment was needed to conform the complaint to evidence accepted during the earlier trial and to clarify the factual allegations supporting Counts V, VI, and VII. They said the proposed pleading added facts from the district court’s earlier findings and did not assert new legal claims. Plaintiffs also argued that the defendants had impliedly consented to trial of the issues by failing to object to the evidence and would not be prejudiced because they had notice of the relevant facts and theories.

The defendants argued that the proposed complaint improperly sought to recreate Counts I and II, which had been rejected on appeal, by moving their underlying facts and theories into Counts V, VI, and VII. They also argued that plaintiffs had not tried Counts V through VII as release-related claims and that the amendment would exceed the Eighth Circuit’s remand instructions.

Court’s Analysis

The court held that the proposed amendment was not appropriate under Rule 15(b)(2) or any other rule. It agreed with the defendants that the proposed pleading attempted to reanimate Counts I and II by relocating their underlying facts and issues to Counts V through VII. The court stated that Rule 15(b)(2) permits amendment to raise issues not included in the pleadings, but does not permit a party to plead old issues in new places.

The court also ruled that amendment would be futile. In this context, futile means that the amended claims could not survive a motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the law-of-the-case doctrine—the rule that a district court generally must follow issues finally decided by the court of appeals—barred reconsideration of the facts and issues underlying Counts I and II regardless of where plaintiffs placed them in the complaint.

The court further held that the amendment would improperly expand the scope of the Eighth Circuit’s remand. The appeals court had distinguished the release-related claims in Counts I and II from the conditions-of-confinement claims in Counts V through VII and had instructed the district court to apply particular legal standards to the latter claims. The district court stated that it was bound by that directive.

The court rejected the defendants’ request to dismiss the remaining Counts V through VII at that time, finding insufficient grounds to conclude that plaintiffs had abandoned those claims.

Disposition

The court denied plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint. The order did not dismiss Counts V through VII at this time. Judge Donovan W. Frank also encouraged the parties to try to settle the remaining issues.