Bergman v. Johnson & Johnson

Background

Sarah Bergman and Patricia Budnik alleged that they developed complications after procedures involving pelvic mesh products manufactured by Johnson & Johnson and Ethicon, Inc. The opinion identifies Ethicon as a wholly owned subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson. The plaintiffs alleged that the companies knew about risks associated with the products, marketed them as safe and effective, and failed to disclose or adequately warn about those risks.

The First Amended Complaint asserted fourteen counts: negligence; strict liability for design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to warn; gross negligence; negligent infliction of emotional distress; breach of warranty; fraudulent concealment; constructive fraud; common-law fraud; negligent misrepresentation; unjust enrichment; loss of consortium; and punitive damages.

Court’s analysis

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court concluded that the complaint lacked foundational facts about the plaintiffs’ injuries, including details about when the injuries were discovered and the revision procedures allegedly performed. It also found that many claims were not recognized under Minnesota law or did not satisfy heightened pleading requirements.

The court dismissed Count II, strict-liability design defect, because the complaint did not adequately connect the alleged design defects to the plaintiffs’ particular injuries. It dismissed Count III, strict-liability manufacturing defect, because the plaintiffs did not allege that the products they received deviated from correctly manufactured products.

Count I, negligence, survived only as to negligent failure to warn. The court dismissed the negligent design-defect and negligent manufacturing-defect theories because the corresponding factual allegations were insufficient. It dismissed Count IV, gross negligence, because Minnesota law does not recognize gross negligence as a separate cause of action from ordinary negligence. It dismissed Count V, negligent infliction of emotional distress, because the complaint did not adequately allege that the plaintiffs were in a zone of danger or suffered sufficiently specific severe emotional distress. It dismissed Count XI, negligent misrepresentation, because the allegations lacked the required details and Minnesota courts had not recognized that theory for physical-harm damages in this context.

The court dismissed Counts VIII through X—fraudulent concealment, constructive fraud, and common-law fraud—because the complaint did not provide sufficient details about who made the alleged misrepresentations, what was said, where and when it was said, why it was false, or how it caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. It dismissed Count VII, breach of warranty, because the complaint did not identify the alleged express warranties specifically enough to overcome the four-year limitations issue discussed by the court. The court dismissed Count XII, unjust enrichment, because the allegations sounded in tort rather than in an implied or quasi-contract.

The court dismissed Count XIV, punitive damages, because Minnesota law requires a later motion to add such a claim, while the plaintiffs had included it in the complaint without filing that motion. The court stated that it could consider a later motion to amend seeking punitive damages.

Disposition

Judge John R. Tunheim denied as moot the defendants’ earlier motion to dismiss. He granted in part the defendants’ motion for partial dismissal. Count I was dismissed without prejudice as to design-defect and manufacturing-defect negligence theories but not as to failure to warn. Counts II through V and VII through XII, as well as Count XIV, were dismissed without prejudice. Counts VI, strict-liability failure to warn, and XIII, loss of consortium, were not dismissed.