Salinas v. Hirachen

Background

Albert A. Salinas, who was civilly committed and housed at the St. Peter Regional Treatment Center, sued eight treatment-center employees in their official and individual capacities. Salinas alleged that he had post-traumatic stress disorder and used art to manage its symptoms.

After an August 10, 2020 incident with another patient, Salinas was placed on “unit status.” On August 13, he was transferred from a non-secure unit to the secure Pine Unit because staff determined that he could not safely remain in the non-secure unit due to concerns about his psychiatric and behavioral stability. Salinas alleged that the transfer could lengthen his commitment by at least 18 months and caused him to lose privileges and access to art supplies. He also alleged that staff misrepresented what happened during the incident, failed to treat his PTSD, and failed to tell him the rules and restrictions associated with unit status.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which concerns whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Rulings on the Claims

The court first held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Salinas’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their official capacities. It also held that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal-court jurisdiction over his state medical-malpractice claim against Hirachen in her official capacity because the opinion found no indication that Minnesota had waived its immunity.

The court dismissed the First Amendment retaliation claim against Mohsin, Clark, Sander, Ruiz, Harowski, and Otto. Although the defendants did not dispute that the transfer to Pine Unit could qualify as adverse action, the court held that Salinas had not plausibly alleged that his statement that he would “defend [him]self to the fullest” was protected speech. In the court’s view, the statement, in the context alleged, plausibly raised a security concern and could constitute unprotected “fighting words.”

The court dismissed the Second Amendment claims against Mohsin, Sander, and Otto because Salinas’s allegations did not concern keeping or bearing arms for self-defense.

The court dismissed Salinas’s Eighth Amendment claims because the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment applies to conditions of prisoners’ confinement, and the court held that it does not apply to civilly committed psychiatric patients confined for treatment. The court stated that the rights of patients in Salinas’s position more appropriately arise under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The court then dismissed Salinas’s Fourteenth Amendment claims. Applying the deliberate-indifference standard used for deficient-medical-care claims by civilly committed patients, the court held that Salinas had not alleged facts showing that Hirachen, Mohsin, Clark, Sander, or Harowski actually knew of and deliberately disregarded an objectively serious medical need. The court also held that Hirachen could not be held personally liable merely because of her supervisory role, and that Salinas’s allegations against the other defendants were speculative or conclusory.

The court rejected Salinas’s claim that the transfer to Pine Unit was punitive. It held that he had not plausibly alleged an expressed intent to punish or shown that the transfer lacked a rational relationship to legitimate purposes such as maintaining order and security. The court also rejected the procedural due-process claims against Sander and Tressler, finding that approximately one day on unit status did not implicate a protected liberty interest and that the attached records showed Sander notified Salinas of the reason for the placement.

The court further held that Salinas failed to state an equal-protection claim based on his allegation that he was transferred to a higher-security unit while the other patient was not. The court found that he had not alleged intentional unequal treatment, the absence of a rational basis, responsibility by a particular defendant, or that he and the other patient were similarly situated.

State-Law Claim and Qualified Immunity

Construing the complaint liberally, the court found that Salinas attempted to bring a medical-malpractice claim against Hirachen. The court held that his allegation that Hirachen was incompetent was conclusory and that he did not allege facts supporting the required elements: the applicable medical standard of care, a departure from that standard, and injury directly caused by the departure. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.

The court additionally held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from civil damages unless their conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time. The court concluded that Salinas had not shown that the defendants’ actions to maintain security at the treatment center violated clearly established law.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and ordered judgment entered. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.