Tristan M. v. Kijakazi

Background

Tristan M. applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming disability beginning in September 2017 based on Crohn’s disease, colitis, spondyloarthritis, sacroiliitis, anxiety, depression, and cyclic vomiting syndrome. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an administrative law judge issued an unfavorable decision, and the Appeals Council denied review.

Tristan M. filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to remand the case. He argued that the administrative law judge failed to follow the required process for evaluating drug addiction and alcoholism, failed to consider whether he qualified for a closed period of disability, and incorrectly determined his residual functional capacity. He also argued that limits on the President’s ability to remove the Social Security Commissioner violated separation-of-powers principles and invalidated the administrative law judge’s authority to decide his claims. He requested a new hearing before a different administrative law judge.

The Commissioner filed a motion to remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner stated that, on remand, the administrative law judge would reevaluate Tristan M.’s severe impairments and explain the connection between the evidence and the residual-functional-capacity findings. Tristan M. did not oppose the Commissioner’s motion. The Commissioner did not respond to Tristan M.’s request for a different administrative law judge.

Court’s Analysis

Under sentence four of Section 405(g), a court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision and remand the matter for another hearing. Because the parties agreed that the case should be remanded, the court reversed the administrative law judge’s decision and ordered further proceedings.

The court expressly did not decide the merits of Tristan M.’s separation-of-powers challenge. It held that the Commissioner’s failure to oppose the request for a different administrative law judge waived that issue, meaning the court treated the request as no longer contested.

Disposition

The court granted Tristan M.’s motion in part to the extent he sought a remand and a hearing before a different administrative law judge, and denied the motion in part as to his remaining requests. The court granted the Commissioner’s motion to remand, reversed the administrative law judge’s decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings under sentence four of Section 405(g). The remand must be assigned to a different administrative law judge from the one who conducted the original hearing and issued the reversed decision.