William E. v. Kijakazi

Background

William E. challenged the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The parties consented to a final decision by United States Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. The case was limited to proceedings before the administrative law judge after a prior related proceeding had resulted in a remand.

The administrative law judge held a hearing on March 10, 2020, at which William E. was represented by attorney Dana W. Duncan. After the hearing, the administrative law judge requested written answers from Michael A. Lace, Psy.D., an impartial medical expert. Lace identified limitations including a substance-free workplace, no fast-paced production-line work, and routine tasks.

On April 23, the administrative law judge sent counsel a letter offering the new evidence and identifying ways to respond, including requesting a supplemental hearing. The letter said that William E. had 10 days to respond and that, unless a supplemental hearing was found necessary, the administrative law judge would enter the evidence and issue a decision. The letter incorrectly identified the evidence as Exhibit 17F; the responses were actually in Exhibit 16F.

Counsel received the letter on April 27. On May 3, counsel checked the electronic record, could not find the exhibit identified as 17F, and left a message with the Minneapolis Office of Hearings Operations. On May 7, counsel checked again and learned that the unfavorable decision, dated May 11, had been completed and uploaded on May 6. Counsel later received the decision by mail on May 11.

The administrative law judge gave significant weight to Lace’s answers when determining William E.’s residual functional capacity—the most he could still do despite his impairments. The administrative law judge found that William E. could perform light work with several limitations, including no public interaction, brief and superficial interaction with others, no complex decision-making, no rapid assembly-line work, and an environment free from illicit drugs and alcohol.

Arguments and legal standard

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. William E. argued that he had not received a full and fair hearing because he did not have access to Lace’s answers in time to respond. Counsel stated that, had the answers been available, he would have requested a supplemental hearing to question Lace and further vocational testimony concerning additional limitations.

The Commissioner argued that the incorrect exhibit number was only a typographical error and that the answers were available in the electronic record under Exhibit 16F. The Commissioner also argued that the notice was sufficient and that William E. failed to respond within the deadline. The Commissioner maintained that the administrative law judge issued the decision on May 11, but did not address the evidence that it had been issued on May 6.

The court reviewed whether the administrative law judge’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, meaning relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate. The court also considered whether William E. received the full and fair hearing required in Social Security disability proceedings and by procedural due process.

Court’s analysis

The court stated that the exhibit-number error alone might not have deprived William E. of adequate notice because the letter otherwise identified the additional evidence and explained the available procedures. The decisive problem was that the administrative law judge issued the decision before the promised 10-day response period ended.

Based on unrebutted evidence, the court found that the decision was issued on May 6. That was before the response deadline whether the period was measured from counsel’s April 27 receipt of the letter or from an assumed April 28 receipt with a mailing period. The court concluded that William E.’s opportunity to respond to the additional evidence was cut short.

The court did not find that the premature issuance was intentional and described it as an administrative error. Nevertheless, under the circumstances, William E. was not given a meaningful opportunity to address Lace’s answers, which the administrative law judge had relied on in part to deny the claim.

Disposition

The court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. On remand, William E. was to receive a meaningful opportunity to address Lace’s interrogatory responses.