Howard v. Weidemann

Background

Robert Francis Howard brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal civil-rights statute, against White Earth Tribal Police Officers Ben Weidemann and Brandon Meyer in their individual capacities. He alleged that the officers unlawfully seized him and used excessive force during an April 27, 2018 traffic stop on the White Earth Reservation. Howard sought damages for alleged physical and emotional injuries, including aggravation of a torn rotator cuff, bruising around his wrists, and pain.

Weidemann observed Howard driving 43 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone and activated his lights and sirens. Howard continued driving for more than a minute before parking near a post office. After Howard began walking toward the post office despite Weidemann’s commands to remain in his vehicle, Weidemann took hold of him, handcuffed him, and placed him in the squad car. Weidemann investigated possible impaired driving, removed the handcuffs, administered a breath test, and issued Howard a speeding citation for tribal court. Meyer arrived during the stop but, according to the court, never touched Howard.

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is entered when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Section 1983 claims

The court held that Howard had not presented a trial-worthy dispute about whether the defendants acted under color of state law. Section 1983 requires the challenged conduct to be carried out under color of state law. The court found that Weidemann and Meyer acted as tribal officers enforcing the White Earth Traffic Code. They wore tribal police uniforms, used marked White Earth Tribal Police Department vehicles, identified themselves as White Earth officers, and issued Howard a citation for violating the tribal traffic code.

The court considered Howard’s reliance on a cooperative law-enforcement agreement that authorized the officers to enforce state criminal law on the reservation. It concluded that the undisputed evidence showed the officers did not invoke or threaten state-law authority during this stop. The reference to the State of Minnesota and Becker County on the citation did not change the court’s conclusion; Weidemann explained that those references resulted from the citation software, and he told Howard the citation was for tribal court.

Because the officers were not acting under color of state law, the court granted summary judgment on that basis. The opinion also noted that conduct under tribal law may be examined in federal court under the Indian Civil Rights Act, but Howard’s claims in this case were brought under § 1983.

Qualified immunity and constitutional claims

The court separately addressed qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a constitutional right or the right was not clearly established. The court said that if a jury could find the officers acted under color of state law, the defendants would still be entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed video evidence showed no constitutional violation.

For the unreasonable-seizure claim, the court found that Weidemann had reasonable suspicion to stop Howard after observing him speeding. Howard’s failure to pull over promptly, his repeated attempts to walk away, and his apparent difficulty responding to commands gave Weidemann additional grounds to detain him and investigate possible impaired driving. The court found the nearly 27-minute stop objectively reasonable because the officers checked Howard’s license, investigated possible impairment, and issued the speeding citation.

For the excessive-force claim, the court found the force objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Weidemann took hold of Howard and led him to the squad car after Howard walked away from commands, handcuffed him after Howard jerked his arm forward, and placed him in the squad car while Weidemann was the only officer at the scene. The court characterized the force as minimal and noted that Howard did not complain that the handcuffs were too tight or that he was in pain during the encounter. The court therefore found no genuine dispute that the defendants’ actions were objectively reasonable. Because Weidemann did not use excessive force, Meyer could not be liable for failing to prevent it.

Bivens claims

In his opposition to summary judgment, Howard attempted to assert claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, an implied damages remedy for certain constitutional violations by federal officers. The court held that his complaint did not give the defendants fair notice of those claims. The complaint referred to § 1983 and alleged that the defendants acted as agents of Becker County or Minnesota, but it did not invoke Bivens, allege federal-officer status, or include facts supporting claims based on federal law.

The court also found that Howard’s proposed Bivens claims were not merely mislabeled versions of his pleaded claims. They would require different basic factual allegations and could require additional discovery and motion practice. The court therefore would not allow Howard to avoid summary judgment on his § 1983 claims by raising Bivens claims for the first time in his opposition brief.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and ordered judgment entered accordingly. The opinion also notes that Howard’s separate battery and false-arrest claims had previously been dismissed without prejudice after the United States was substituted as a defendant for those claims only.