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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled Jan. 14, 2022

Jenni v. DMV-Moorhead

Judge
Eric Tostrud
Docket
0:20-cv-01600
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
9
Civil RightsSection 1983Civil ProcedureMotion to Dismiss
In one sentence

In Jenni v. DMV-Moorhead, Judge Tostrud granted dismissal and dismissed the action without prejudice because the DMV was not suable and service was defective.

Who this affects

Mark Jenni’s First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DMV-Moorhead and Chelsea Sylvester was dismissed without prejudice because DMV-Moorhead was not subject to suit and Sylvester was not properly served.

What happened

In Mark Jenni v. DMV-Moorhead and Chelsea Sylvester, Mark Jenni claimed that he was denied service and cited for trespassing after recording inside a motor-vehicle office, violating his First Amendment rights.

Jenni represented himself. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the case or grant summary judgment, arguing that DMV-Moorhead was not a legal entity that could be sued and that Jenni had not properly served Chelsea Sylvester. Jenni served Sylvester with a summons but not a copy of the complaint, and he did not respond to the motion.

The court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the action without prejudice. It ruled that DMV-Moorhead could not be sued separately from the county and that service on Sylvester was incomplete; it did not decide whether Jenni’s First Amendment claim had merit. Judge Eric C. Tostrud issued the order.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Jenni v. DMV-Moorhead · No. 0:20-cv-01600
Judge
Eric Tostrud
Date
Jan. 14, 2022

Background

Mark Jenni, representing himself, alleged that Defendants DMV-Moorhead and Chelsea Sylvester, a DMV employee, violated his First Amendment rights. He said he went to the Moorhead motor-vehicle office to obtain a new vehicle title and recorded the interaction because he sometimes had difficulty remembering such interactions and wanted to understand why the title was taking two months. According to his complaint, an employee told him he could not record, he was refused service, police were called, and he was detained, trespassed, and required to identify himself. The court construed his constitutional claim as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law that provides a way to seek relief for constitutional violations by state or local officials.

Defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment. They argued that DMV-Moorhead was not a separate legal entity subject to suit and that Sylvester had not been properly served. Jenni had certificates showing that summonses were served on Sylvester, but the certificates did not show that a copy of the complaint was served. Sylvester stated that the complaint was never served on her. Jenni did not submit contrary evidence and did not respond to the motion by the deadline.

DMV-Moorhead

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) directs the court to use Minnesota law to determine whether DMV-Moorhead had the capacity to be sued. The court explained that Minnesota law gives counties the power to sue and be sued, but does not give that power to departments or other county subdivisions. It therefore held that DMV-Moorhead was not a legal entity subject to suit.

The court dismissed the claim against DMV-Moorhead and declined to give Jenni an opportunity to amend the complaint to name Clay County instead. The court noted that Jenni had been alerted to the problem since at least the defendants’ November 2020 answer, the deadline for amending pleadings had passed, and Jenni had not requested permission to amend.

Service on Sylvester

The court analyzed the service issue under Rule 12(b)(5), which permits dismissal for insufficient service of process. Both federal and Minnesota rules require a plaintiff to serve the summons together with a copy of the complaint. Because Jenni served Sylvester with the summons but not the complaint, the court found that he had not established that service was legally sufficient.

More than 90 days had passed since the case was filed. Under Rule 4(m), the court considered whether Jenni had shown good cause for failing to complete service and whether an extension should nevertheless be allowed. The court found that Jenni had not attempted to serve Sylvester with the complaint despite having notice of the problem for more than a year. It found no good cause or excusable neglect and declined to extend the service period.

Disposition

The court stated that the defendants’ motion was granted on these grounds and that it was unnecessary to address their arguments challenging the merits of Jenni’s claim. The order granted Defendants DMV-Moorhead and Chelsea Sylvester’s Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and dismissed this action without prejudice. Judgment was ordered to be entered accordingly.

The authoritative version

Read the full 9-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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