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D. Minn.Procedural orderFiled Sept. 14, 2023

Chairse v. State of Minnesota Department of Human Services

Judge
Eric Tostrud
Docket
0:23-cv-00355
Court
U.S. District Court · District of Minnesota
Pages
23
Civil ProcedureMotion to DismissCivil RightsSection 1983
In one sentence

In Chairse v. Department, Judge Tostrud granted in part and denied in part dismissal: six claims were dismissed without prejudice, while two due-process claims survived.

Who this affects

The ruling affected O’Shea Chairse and Sean Burgess’s claims against the Minnesota Department of Human Services and Commissioner Jodi Harpstead. Six claims were dismissed without prejudice, the federal and Minnesota procedural-due-process claims were allowed to proceed at the pleading stage, and Harpstead’s individual-capacity claims were dismissed.

What happened

Chairse v. State of Minnesota Department of Human Services concerns O’Shea Chairse and Sean Burgess’s allegations that their admissions to state-operated treatment programs were delayed after civil commitments, despite a Minnesota law requiring admission within 48 hours.

The court found the plaintiffs’ substantive due-process, negligence, false-imprisonment, emotional-distress, and mandamus claims legally insufficient. Their federal and Minnesota procedural-due-process claims were plausible because the statute created a protected interest and did not provide procedures for challenging delayed or denied priority admission.

Judge Eric C. Tostrud granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion without prejudice as to Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, and denied it as to Counts 2 and 5. The individual-capacity claims against Commissioner Jodi Harpstead were also dismissed.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Chairse v. State of Minnesota Department of Human Services · No. 0:23-cv-00355
Judge
Eric Tostrud
Date
Sept. 14, 2023

Background

O’Shea Chairse and Sean Burgess alleged that they were civilly committed while held in Minnesota county jails on criminal charges. They claimed that Minnesota Statutes section 253B.10, subdivision 1(b), required their admission to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours, but that their admissions were delayed substantially longer. Chairse was allegedly committed on or about October 17, 2022, remained in the Hennepin County Jail until December 5, 2022, and was then admitted to a treatment center. Burgess was allegedly committed on or about November 9, 2022, remained in the Ramsey County Adult Detention Center until early February 2023, and was then admitted to a drug treatment center. After becoming ill with COVID-19, Burgess was returned to the detention center.

The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Human Services and Jodi Harpstead, the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services, in her official and individual capacities. Their amended complaint asserted federal and Minnesota constitutional due-process claims, negligence, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a request for a writ of mandamus requiring compliance with the 48-hour rule. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Statutory interpretation

Section 253B.10, subdivision 1(b), states that certain civilly committed patients being admitted from a jail or correctional institution “must be admitted” to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours. The parties disagreed about when that 48-hour period begins. The plaintiffs argued that it begins when a court enters the commitment order. The defendants argued that it begins when a medically appropriate bed becomes available.

The court assumed, without deciding, that the plaintiffs’ interpretation was correct. It cited the limited briefing on the issue, a 2023 statutory amendment that expressly adopted the defendants’ interpretation, and a related case that might provide further guidance. The court did not decide whether the amendment applied retroactively.

Federal substantive due process

The court granted the motion as to Count 1, the plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that the alleged statutory violations deprived them of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. A substantive-due-process claim requires facts plausibly showing infringement of a fundamental right and government conduct that shocks the conscience.

The court found that the amended complaint did not plausibly allege either requirement. It did not allege facts showing that the 48-hour rule reflected a right deeply rooted in national history and tradition. The complaint also advanced a categorical theory that every violation of the rule was conscience-shocking, without individualized allegations supporting that theory. The court therefore granted dismissal without prejudice as to Count 1.

Federal procedural due process

The court denied the motion as to Count 2, the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleging a violation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Procedural due process generally requires a protected liberty or property interest and constitutionally adequate procedures before the government deprives a person of that interest.

The court held that section 253B.10, subdivision 1(b), created a constitutionally enforceable liberty interest. The statute identified specific conditions—being admitted from a jail or correctional institution and falling within one of four listed categories—and mandated admission to a state-operated treatment program within 48 hours when those conditions were met.

The court also found the procedural claim sufficient because the statute did not establish procedures allowing a civilly committed person to show that the person belonged to a priority category, challenge a decision that the person did not qualify, or challenge the risk or fact of admission occurring after the 48-hour period. The court left for later consideration whether an available remedy could redress the plaintiffs’ alleged procedural injuries.

Minnesota constitutional claims

The parties agreed that the Minnesota Constitution’s substantive- and procedural-due-process claims were coextensive with the federal claims. The court therefore granted dismissal without prejudice as to Count 4, the Minnesota substantive-due-process claim.

The court denied the motion as to Count 5, the Minnesota procedural-due-process claim, insofar as the claim was otherwise supported by the same reasoning as the federal procedural claim. But the court separately dismissed the plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims against Commissioner Harpstead. The complaint alleged only general supervisory responsibility and did not plausibly allege her personal involvement, direct responsibility, relevant policy decisions, or failure to train or supervise in connection with the alleged deprivation.

The court also stated that damages were unavailable for the Minnesota constitutional procedural-due-process claim because Minnesota courts had not recognized such a damages cause of action. In addition, a state and state officials acting in their official capacities are not “persons” for purposes of § 1983 damages. The court noted that these limitations, together with the statutory amendment, created uncertainty about what equitable remedy might redress the plaintiffs’ procedural injuries, but the parties had not addressed that issue.

State-law tort claims

The court granted dismissal without prejudice as to Count 3, the negligence and negligence-per-se claim. The plaintiffs identified no underlying common-law duty requiring the Department to prioritize their transfers. The court held that section 253B.10 created a statutory requirement but did not create a private right of action, and that a statute may establish a standard of care for negligence only when an underlying common-law cause of action exists.

The court also granted dismissal without prejudice as to Count 6, the false-imprisonment claim. The plaintiffs did not allege that their initial imprisonments were unlawful, that the Department caused those initial imprisonments, or that the Department intentionally and affirmatively imprisoned them. Their theory was based on the Department’s failure to transfer them, and the court concluded that a failure to act generally does not satisfy the affirmative-act requirement for false imprisonment.

The court granted dismissal without prejudice as to Count 7, the intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. The plaintiffs did not plausibly allege conduct that was extreme and outrageous. Their claim depended on the alleged violation of the 48-hour rule, and they cited no factually similar authority supporting the claim.

Writ of mandamus

The court granted dismissal without prejudice as to Count 8, the request for a writ of mandamus. The amended complaint did not clearly identify the legal authority for the request. If the plaintiffs relied on Minnesota law, the court doubted that a federal district court had authority to issue a writ under Minnesota’s mandamus statute, which gives Minnesota state district courts exclusive original jurisdiction over mandamus cases. If the plaintiffs relied on federal law, the federal mandamus statute authorizes orders compelling officers or employees of the United States, not state actors.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted without prejudice as to Count 1, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process; Count 3, negligence and negligence per se; Count 4, Minnesota substantive due process; Count 6, false imprisonment; Count 7, intentional infliction of emotional distress; and Count 8, writ of mandamus. It was denied as to Count 2, Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process, and Count 5, Minnesota procedural due process. The order did not decide the ultimate merits of the remaining procedural-due-process claims.

The authoritative version

Read the full 23-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

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