Independence-Alliance Party of Minnesota v. Simon

Background

The Independence-Alliance Party of Minnesota and Hugh McTavish sued Steve Simon in his official capacity as Minnesota secretary of state. McTavish was a Party member and a 2022 gubernatorial candidate. The plaintiffs brought a claim under Section 1983, a federal law allowing claims against state officials for violations of federal rights, and alleged that Minnesota Statutes section 204B.07, subdivision 4 violated their First Amendment right to expressive association.

Minnesota law requires people who sign a minor-party candidate’s nominating petition to accept an oath stating that they do not intend to vote in the primary election for the office involved. Making a false oath is perjury and may be punished by up to five years in prison, a fine of up to $10,000, or both. The court noted that an earlier decision interpreted the oath as addressing the signer’s present intention: a signer may later change their mind and vote in the primary.

The plaintiffs planned to use the petition process to place McTavish on the ballot and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing Simon from enforcing the oath requirement in connection with any candidacy. Because they sought relief extending beyond their own circumstances, the court treated the challenge as facial, meaning an attack on the law in all its applications.

Likelihood of success

A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary temporary remedy. The court considered four factors: likely success on the merits, likely irreparable harm, the balance of harms, and the public interest. Because the plaintiffs sought to block enforcement of a statute, the court required them to show that they were more likely than not to prevail.

The court applied the Anderson-Burdick framework, which weighs the burden an election rule places on constitutional rights against the state’s reasons for adopting the rule. The court concluded at this stage that the alleged burdens were not substantial and therefore required less demanding review.

The court gave several reasons. The record said only that “some” voters were reluctant or unwilling to sign because of the oath, without identifying a number or range. The plaintiffs also offered no evidence showing how often voters asked about the oath, how long explanations took, or how that time compared with other questions. The court found that providing an explanation that the oath concerns present intent and does not prevent a later primary vote would impose only a minimal burden.

The court also found no evidence that the oath requirement prevented the Party from obtaining enough signatures. The Party had described nine past efforts to place candidates on the ballot through nominating petitions, six of which succeeded. The court said the record did not adequately connect the Party’s unsuccessful efforts to the oath requirement.

The court further reasoned that the plaintiffs had not identified any prosecution for violating the oath, much less an unwarranted prosecution. It rejected the argument that the requirement was discriminatory merely because it applied to the nominating-petition process used by minor parties. The court also noted that Minnesota requires primary voters to sign a roster containing a similar warning about false information, while petition signers may change their minds and later vote in a primary.

The court accepted Minnesota’s stated interests in election-process integrity, requiring a preliminary showing of support before ballot access, avoiding ballot overcrowding and frivolous candidacies, and deterring “party raiding”—using a minor-party candidate to draw votes away from another candidate. Because the plaintiffs had not shown a substantial burden, the court concluded that these important interests ordinarily justified the oath requirement. It therefore found that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their First Amendment claim.

Irreparable harm and other factors

The court separately found that the plaintiffs had not shown likely irreparable harm, meaning harm that could not adequately be remedied later with money damages or another legal remedy. The court’s conclusion that the oath was not substantially burdensome supported this finding. The court also emphasized that the plaintiffs waited until shortly before the 2022 signature-gathering period to seek emergency relief, even though the Party had information about the issue dating back to 2015.

The balance-of-harms factor favored the Secretary because an injunction would prevent application of duly enacted election legislation that the plaintiffs had not shown to be unconstitutional. The public-interest factor also favored the Secretary. Although the public has an important interest in political association and supporting candidates without fear of prosecution, the court emphasized the public interest in keeping election rules settled immediately before an election. The signature-gathering window was scheduled to open the next day.

Disposition

Judge Eric C. Tostrud denied the plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and for a Preliminary Injunction. The order did not grant the requested emergency relief stopping enforcement of section 204B.07, subdivision 4.