Katherine A. G. v. Kijakazi

Background

Katherine A. G. sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. The administrative law judge used the required five-step disability process. The judge found that Katherine A. G. had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date of January 1, 2016; had severe impairments involving degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease in both knees and shoulders, and obesity; and did not have an impairment meeting or medically equaling a listed impairment.

The administrative law judge determined that Katherine A. G. could perform light work with several restrictions, including lifting up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, changing positions every 30 minutes, avoiding certain activities and hazards, and only occasionally reaching overhead with either arm. Based on that assessment, the administrative law judge made findings at the later steps concerning past work and other work.

Medical-opinion evidence

Katherine A. G. argued that the administrative law judge erred by failing to assign weight to Dr. Scott McPherson’s independent medical examination report. The Commissioner argued that Dr. McPherson had not provided a medical opinion and therefore did not need to be evaluated.

The court rejected that argument. Dr. McPherson conducted an in-person examination, reviewed and discussed Katherine A. G.’s medical history, and gave opinions about her physical capabilities and limitations as of June 13, 2017. Because the report addressed what she could still do despite her impairments, the court held that it was a medical opinion the administrative law judge was required to address. The court also explained that the fact that the report was prepared for a workers’ compensation claim did not remove the obligation to evaluate it.

The administrative law judge did not mention Dr. McPherson’s report. The court also found that the administrative law judge’s general statement that workers’ compensation opinions were not persuasive was insufficient because it did not show that the individual opinions had been properly considered.

Overhead-lifting restriction

The court separately found that the residual functional capacity assessment did not properly address overhead lifting. The administrative law judge limited Katherine A. G. to occasional overhead reaching but did not explain why the assessment contained no weight restriction for overhead lifting or evaluate Dr. McPherson’s opinion on that issue.

The record included evidence supporting an overhead-lifting restriction, including a treating physician’s recommendation that Katherine A. G. avoid lifting more than five pounds overhead with her left shoulder, a functional-capacity evaluation limiting shoulder-to-overhead lifting to five pounds on a seldom basis, and Dr. McPherson’s opinion that the functional-capacity restrictions were appropriate. The court distinguished overhead reaching from overhead lifting: reaching involves extending the hands and arms, while lifting involves raising or lowering an object.

The court concluded that the administrative law judge’s failure to address the overhead-lifting evidence, together with the failure to evaluate Dr. McPherson’s report, prevented meaningful review of the residual functional capacity determination. The error was not harmless because the court could not determine whether the administrative law judge would have reached the same result after considering the evidence.

Disposition

The court did not address Katherine A. G.’s additional arguments because the identified errors required a remand. It ordered the administrative law judge to reconsider all medical opinions relevant to the residual functional capacity, including opinions addressing overhead-lifting limits; explain how supportability and consistency were considered; identify substantial evidence supporting the assessment; and reconsider the fourth and fifth steps of the disability analysis. The court noted that the administrative law judge’s incorrect citation to a vocational code was harmless, although the correct code should be cited on remand.

The order granted Katherine A. G.’s motion for summary judgment in part, denied the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).