Norgren v. Minnesota Department of Human Services

Background

Aaron Norgren alleged that he worked for the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) as a Forensic Support Specialist in its Forensic Mental Health Program. He alleged that DHS required all employees to complete trainings titled “How to be Antiracist” and “Understanding Gender Identity and Expression: Moving Beyond the Binary.” Norgren objected to the first training because he associated it with Critical Race Theory and objected to the second because he believed nonbinary gender conflicted with his religious beliefs. He requested a religious exemption, but DHS denied it.

Norgren also alleged that DHS denied him a day off after he attempted to call in because of bad weather, although the day was later granted retroactively. He filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission based on that incident. He later applied for a permanent Group Supervisor Assistant position but was told he was not eligible for an interview because he did not meet the position’s minimum qualifications. He amended his charge to include the lost promotion opportunity.

Claims and Motion

Norgren’s complaint asserted racial discrimination, religious discrimination, and retaliation claims against DHS under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Minnesota Human Rights Act. He also asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Commissioner Jodi Harpstead in her individual capacity, alleging retaliation under the First Amendment and compelled speech. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for failure to state a legally sufficient claim, while Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) concern the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

Court’s Analysis

Title VII racial-discrimination claim. The court held that Count I did not plausibly allege that similarly situated employees outside Norgren’s protected group were promoted instead of him. The complaint did not allege that the permanent position was filled or provide facts about the successful candidate. The court dismissed Count I for failure to state a Title VII race-discrimination claim.

Title VII religious-discrimination claim. The court held that Count II did not provide facts showing that similarly situated employees of another religion, who also objected to the training, were treated differently, or that other facts supported an inference of religious discrimination. The complaint’s general statement that other similarly situated employees were not denied the promotion was insufficient. The court dismissed Count II for failure to state a Title VII religious-discrimination claim.

Title VII retaliation claim. Norgren alleged that filing his initial Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charge was protected activity and that DHS’s later refusal to interview him for the permanent position was retaliation. The court assumed, without deciding, that the complaint adequately alleged the first two parts of a retaliation claim. It held, however, that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the charge was the cause of the adverse employment action. The permanent position had more demanding and mandatory qualifications than the temporary position, for which Norgren had previously been considered. The court also held that the timing alone was insufficient. It dismissed Count III for failure to state a Title VII retaliation claim.

Section 1983 claim against Commissioner Harpstead. The court held that Norgren did not allege specific personal conduct by Commissioner Harpstead violating his constitutional rights. The allegations focused on DHS supervisors, and conclusory statements that Harpstead engaged in promotion discrimination or deprived Norgren of his rights were insufficient.

The court also held that Norgren did not plausibly allege First Amendment retaliation because he did not allege that Harpstead personally took an adverse action against him or knew about his application for the permanent position. His compelled-speech claim also failed because he did not allege that Harpstead or another government actor required him to make, avoid, or affirm certain statements. Finally, the court held that qualified immunity protected Harpstead because Norgren identified no controlling cases with similar facts that would have put her on notice that her alleged conduct violated clearly established rights.

Minnesota Human Rights Act claims. Norgren conceded that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his state-law claims against DHS and agreed that those claims should be dismissed without prejudice. The court declined to rule on whether the claims were tolled for statute-of-limitations purposes and dismissed Counts V through VII without prejudice.

Disposition

Judge Montgomery ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted. Counts I through IV were dismissed with prejudice. Counts V through VII were dismissed without prejudice. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.