Marshall v. Alameda Contra Costa Transit District

Background

Danny Marshall alleged that he had served as AC Transit’s Mentor Coordinator beginning in 2016, performed the job satisfactorily, and was removed from the position and replaced by a less senior and less qualified female colleague. He alleged that the removal amounted to a demotion, caused lost pay and employment benefits, and violated the collective bargaining agreement between AC Transit and ATU Local 192.

Marshall sued Alameda Contra Costa Transit District, ATU Local 192, and Robert Coleman, the union’s president. His claims were for violations of Section 1983, discrimination and failure to prevent discrimination under California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, breach of the duty of fair representation, breach of contract, violation of California Public Utilities Code Section 2107, and violation of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b). AC Transit removed the case from Alameda Superior Court to federal court. The defendants moved to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Section 1983 Claims

Marshall based his Section 1983 claims on the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The court concluded that he did not allege protected speech or retaliation for protected speech, so he failed to state a First Amendment claim. His allegations concerned a demotion and did not describe a search or seizure, so they did not state a Fourth Amendment claim. The court also held that the Ninth Amendment does not independently secure a constitutional right for purposes of a civil-rights claim.

As to the Fourteenth Amendment, the court held that Marshall did not allege facts showing a legitimate entitlement to the Mentor Coordinator position. His reference to the collective bargaining agreement did not establish such an entitlement because he did not identify the relevant provisions. The court also held that Marshall did not adequately allege municipal liability against AC Transit because he did not identify the person with final policymaking authority over the decision.

The court dismissed the Section 1983 claims. The opinion states that the Ninth Amendment claim was dismissed without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. The conclusion states that the first claim was dismissed with leave to amend except for the portions identified there as involving ATU Local 192 and AC Transit.

Duty of Fair Representation

The court declined to dismiss Marshall’s breach-of-contract and FEHA claims against ATU Local 192 on the theory that those claims were subsumed by his duty-of-fair-representation claim. The court explained that the cited authority involved a different federal labor-law framework and did not establish that state-law claims are subsumed by a state duty of fair representation.

The court nevertheless dismissed Marshall’s duty-of-fair-representation claims against ATU Local 192 and Coleman because he did not adequately allege that he exhausted the union’s internal appeal procedures. The court rejected his arguments that he was unaware of the procedures or that pursuing them would have been futile. Those claims were dismissed without leave to amend.

FEHA Claims

The court declined to dismiss Marshall’s FEHA discrimination claims against AC Transit and ATU Local 192. The defendants did not dispute that Marshall plausibly alleged that he was a member of a protected class, was qualified for the position, and suffered an adverse employment action. The court held that his allegation that a less senior and less qualified woman received the position supported a plausible inference that gender was a reason for the adverse action.

Because the discrimination allegations were sufficient, the court also found that Marshall adequately pleaded the foundation for his FEHA claim based on failure to prevent discrimination.

Breach of Contract

The court held that Marshall did not adequately plead his contract claim because he did not identify the specific contract provisions that defendants allegedly breached. It dismissed the breach-of-contract claim against AC Transit without leave to amend, citing the rule that public employees’ remedies are generally governed by statute or ordinance rather than a continuing employment contract. The court dismissed the breach-of-contract claim against ATU Local 192 with leave to amend.

Other Statutory Claims

The court dismissed Marshall’s claim under California Public Utilities Code Section 2107 without leave to amend because that provision does not create a private cause of action. It also dismissed his claim under 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b) without leave to amend because the Urban Mass Transportation Act does not create a federal cause of action for breaches of collective bargaining agreements.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. It dismissed Marshall’s first, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh claims, while allowing the FEHA claims to proceed. The court allowed Marshall 28 days to file an amended complaint solely to address the deficiencies identified in the order. It stated that failure to file a timely amended complaint would result in dismissal of the claims with prejudice. The court also continued the case management conference to December 17, 2024.