Brenizer v. County of Sherburne, The

Background

The plaintiffs were Kyle-William Brenizer, Travis R. Fairbanks, Johnnie L. Haynes, Montez T. Lee, Steven Lincoln, Abdiweli Jama, and all inmates of the Sherburne County Jail. They brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a law allowing claims against state or local actors for violating federal rights. They alleged that COVID-19 policies at the jail restricted out-of-cell exercise and violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and the principles recognized in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York.

Before the pandemic, inmates generally could exercise in the gym for one hour a day, five days a week, and could use other listed exercise options. Beginning March 19, 2020, the jail restricted out-of-cell recreation to limit human interaction and the spread of COVID-19. The jail later restored out-of-cell exercise two days per week beginning July 6, 2021, and increased it to five days per week for eligible inmates beginning August 16, 2021, subject to COVID-19 precautions. The plaintiffs alleged that the jail nevertheless failed to provide the stated amount of exercise and imposed unnecessary lockdowns.

The named plaintiffs filed the action without lawyers on May 28, 2021, and later obtained counsel. By the time of the opinion, none of the named plaintiffs was still incarcerated at the jail. They sought damages, a declaration that the policies were unconstitutional, and an order requiring the jail to provide at least seven hours of exercise or recreation outside the cell and adjacent dayroom areas each week, subject to reasonable exceptions.

The proposed groups were: Class A.1, inmates held at the jail between March 19, 2020, and July 5, 2021; Subclass A.2, Class A.1 members who suffered physical injury from the challenged policies; Class B, inmates held between July 6, 2021, and August 16, 2021; and Class C, inmates held between August 17, 2021, and “the present.”

Class-certification rules

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires a proposed class to satisfy four initial requirements: enough members that individual lawsuits would be impractical, common questions of law or fact, representative claims typical of the class, and representatives and lawyers who will adequately protect the class. The proposed class must also satisfy at least one additional Rule 23(b) provision. Before applying those requirements, the court must determine whether the class is objectively ascertainable—meaning that members can be identified using a precise definition and objective criteria.

The court emphasized that the merits of the underlying constitutional claims were not at issue at the class-certification stage.

Ascertainability

The court held that Subclass A.2 was adequately defined even though determining whether a particular person suffered a physical injury caused by the policies could require individualized inquiry. The court concluded that the meaning of “physical injury” was sufficiently clear.

The court held that Class C was not ascertainable because its end date was “the present.” An open-ended definition could create a changing class with new members joining each day and could cause case-management problems. The court noted that the definitions of Classes A.1 and B were not disputed as inadequate.

Rule 23(a) requirements

The court found that the numerosity requirement was satisfied for every proposed class and subclass. Class A.1 could include as many as 1,700 inmates, and Classes B and C could include hundreds of inmates. Although the number of people who suffered physical injuries for purposes of Subclass A.2 was unknown, the court concluded that separating that group from the case would be inefficient and that the broader allegations suggested the subclass likely had enough members.

The court found common questions for Classes A.1, B, and C. Those classes presented common questions about whether the jail’s policies and customs limiting out-of-cell exercise violated the inmates’ constitutional rights. The court held that Subclass A.2 lacked commonality because each member would need to prove injury and causation, creating individualized mini-trials.

The court held that the named plaintiffs were not typical of the proposed classes as a whole. Because they were no longer detained at the jail, they lacked standing to seek prospective relief, such as an injunction or declaration about future conditions. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the challenged conduct was capable of repetition while avoiding review, finding that none of the named plaintiffs showed a reasonable likelihood of being subjected to the policies again. Because the proposed class definitions did not separate claims for damages from claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the named plaintiffs were atypical of the proposed classes as a whole.

The court also held that the adequacy requirement was not met. Although the court did not doubt that class counsel could adequately represent the class, the differences between the named plaintiffs and prospective class members created doubt that the named plaintiffs’ interests were sufficiently similar to those of the class.

Rule 23(b) requirements

The court held that Rule 23(b)(2), which concerns class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief, did not apply. The named plaintiffs—and at least some proposed class members—were no longer detained at the jail and therefore were no longer subject to the challenged policies.

The court considered Rule 23(b)(3), which requires common questions to outweigh individual questions and requires a class action to be the superior method for resolving the dispute. The court agreed that proposed class members were probably disinclined to bring individual lawsuits because they were unlikely to have the resources or counsel to do so. The court did not consider ongoing related litigation because none appeared to exist, and it did not consider the desirability of concentrating the case in that forum because the County did not dispute that factor.

The court nevertheless found that the proposed class action would be difficult to manage. Subclass A.2 would require individualized inquiries into injury and causation. In addition, the plaintiffs had not presented a workable damages formula. A fixed amount per day, with a multiplier for injury, would not account for differences in the severity of injuries. For all classes, determining damages would require examining whether each inmate was actually able and inclined to use the recreation area, whether the inmate was barred from using it for reasons unrelated to the challenged policies, and how many days the inmate could have used it.

The court therefore found that individual questions predominated over class-wide questions concerning injury and damages.

Disposition

The court declined to allow the plaintiffs to amend their proposed class definitions after the parties had fully briefed the motion. It then denied the plaintiffs’ motions to certify the classes and to appoint class representatives and class counsel. The court did not decide the merits of whether the jail’s policies violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.