Rud v. Johnston

Background

James John Rud and Brian Keith Hausfeld, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, sued Nancy Johnston and Jodi Harpstead in their official capacities. The plaintiffs are civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). They alleged that they and other patients received valid orders approving transfer to MSOP’s lower-security Community Preparation Services (CPS) facility but were not transferred within a reasonable time.

Rud’s transfer order became effective on June 6, 2022, but he was not transferred until April 11, 2023, after this lawsuit began and after the court issued a preliminary injunction. Hausfeld’s transfer approval became effective on February 9, 2022, and he was transferred more than nine months later. Hausfeld alleged that, while waiting, he suffered bodily harm and mental and emotional distress after another MSOP patient assaulted him.

The plaintiffs asserted procedural and substantive due process claims, requested a writ of mandamus, and sought damages. They also asked the court to certify an Awaiting Transfer Class and a Delayed Transfer Class.

Motion to Dismiss

The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, under which a complaint must allege enough facts to make the requested relief plausible. The plaintiffs waived the mandamus claim at the motion hearing as moot because Rud had been transferred. The court therefore dismissed that claim.

For procedural due process, the court held that the plaintiffs plausibly alleged both a protected liberty interest and a protected property interest in transfer to CPS within a reasonable time after a valid transfer order. The court relied substantially on a Minnesota Supreme Court decision holding that MSOP may not ignore transfer orders and must carry them out within a reasonable time. The plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that defendants deprived them of those interests without constitutionally adequate procedures. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss as to Count II.

The court dismissed the substantive due process claims. It held that the claimed right to transfer to CPS after a valid order was not a fundamental right deeply rooted in the nation’s history and traditions. The court further held that, even if the right were fundamental, the alleged delays caused by staffing and facility-capacity limitations did not amount to conduct that shocks the conscience or was truly irrational. The court also noted that MSOP patients may complete treatment and be discharged without residing at CPS.

The court dismissed the damages request because the defendants were sued only in their official capacities. It explained that damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are unavailable against state officials sued in their official capacities, and that Minnesota does not provide a comparable statutory damages action for violations of the Minnesota Constitution. The dismissal of the damages request was without prejudice, and the plaintiffs were allowed 30 days to file an amended complaint adding individual-capacity claims.

Class Certification

The proposed Awaiting Transfer Class included MSOP patients with transfer orders who had not yet been transferred. The proposed Delayed Transfer Class included patients who were transferred after experiencing delays. The court found that the proposed classes satisfied numerosity, typicality, and, as to Hausfeld, adequacy of representation. But Rud was no longer an adequate representative of the Awaiting Transfer Class because he had already been transferred and was unlikely to experience the same situation again.

The court held that neither class satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement. Whether defendants violated procedural due process was too broad a question, and determining whether a particular delay was unreasonable would require individualized inquiries. The court gave the example that a patient waiting one month would be in a different position from one waiting more than a year. Because commonality was lacking, the court also found that the proposed classes could not satisfy the predominance requirement for damages classes. The Awaiting Transfer Class also had not shown that one injunction could properly provide relief to every member because the plaintiffs had not established that every patient had waited an unreasonable amount of time.

Disposition

The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order dismissed Counts I, III, and IV with prejudice; dismissed the damages request without prejudice; allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to add individual-capacity claims; and denied the motion to dismiss Count II. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify either class without prejudice, leaving open a renewed certification request if discovery later supports certification.