Fosness v. Minnesota Sex Offender Program

Background

Deanna S. Fosness worked as a Special Teacher for the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP). She had narcolepsy, which made waking difficult and caused fatigue. Her doctor recommended that she work four 10-hour shifts each week rather than five shorter shifts and that her start time be between 7:30 and 8:30 a.m.

Fosness requested an accommodation from MSOP. After a meeting involving MSOP, Fosness, and her union, MSOP initially denied the request. After Fosness filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in July 2017, MSOP granted a four-day schedule running from 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Fridays. MSOP did not allow its Special Teachers to adjust their scheduled start and end times, and clients were not available for classes between 4:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m.

Fosness claimed that MSOP later retaliated against her for filing and amending her discrimination charges. She identified denied or restricted professional-development and training opportunities, denial of flexible start times, and her eventual resignation as examples. She resigned in February 2019 after MSOP denied a three-month professional-development leave to attend summer classes. She later filed another discrimination charge alleging retaliation and that she had been forced to resign because of a hostile work environment.

Fosness sued MSOP, the Minnesota Department of Human Services, and Jodi Harpstead, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, in her official capacity. Her amended complaint asserted four claims: failure to accommodate under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), failure to accommodate under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, retaliation under Title V of the ADA, and reprisal under Minnesota law.

Failure-to-Accommodate Claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for disability-discrimination claims. It focused on whether Fosness had requested the accommodation she claimed the defendants failed to provide: the ability to flex her work time.

The court held that she had not specifically requested flexible scheduling. Her doctor’s recommendation for a start time between 7:30 and 8:30 a.m. did not amount to a request to arrive at any time in that range and extend the workday as needed. Because MSOP scheduled her to begin at 7:30 a.m., within the doctor’s recommended range, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both the federal and state failure-to-accommodate claims.

Retaliation and Reprisal Claims

For the retaliation claims, the court considered whether Fosness engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and showed a connection between the protected activity and the action. The parties did not dispute that filing the discrimination charges was protected activity.

The court rejected Fosness’s arguments concerning flexible scheduling, professional-development requests, and constructive discharge. It found that the lack of flexible scheduling was not an adverse action, noting that neither Special Teacher was allowed to flex work time and that MSOP gave a stated reason related to the timing of client classes. The court also found that requiring formal requests and denying particular training requests for stated reasons did not amount to an adverse action.

The court held that Fosness had not shown constructive discharge. Although she was unhappy with MSOP’s decisions, the court found no evidence of objectively intolerable working conditions or that MSOP actively pushed her out. The court also declined to consider the unemployment-law judge’s findings that she had quit for a good reason caused by the employer, explaining that MSOP had not participated in that hearing and Minnesota law barred use of those findings in a separate action.

The court further found that Fosness had not provided sufficient evidence of causation. Most of the alleged actions occurred months after her discrimination charges, and more than two years passed between her initial charge and her resignation. Finally, even assuming she had established a basic retaliation case, the defendants offered legitimate reasons for their actions, and Fosness did not identify evidence showing those reasons were pretextual, meaning a cover for unlawful retaliation.

Ruling

Judge John R. Tunheim granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all claims. The order directed that judgment be entered accordingly. The court did not decide the defendants’ argument that the Eleventh Amendment barred the state-law claims because it concluded that Fosness would not prevail on those claims at the summary-judgment stage.