Portz v. St. Cloud State University

Background

The plaintiffs are female student-athletes who attended or recently attended St. Cloud State University and participated on its varsity women’s tennis or Nordic skiing teams. They represented a certified class of present, prospective, and future female students at the university who were harmed by, and wanted to end, sex discrimination in athletic participation opportunities and benefits provided to varsity athletes.

After a 2018 bench trial, the court found that St. Cloud State had violated Title IX in its allocation of athletic participation opportunities and in its treatment and benefits for female athletes. The court entered a permanent injunction requiring steps addressing athletic participation opportunities, facilities, travel and other benefits, and other inequalities. The court later awarded $1,154,778.98 in attorney’s fees and $16,663.92 in costs, along with $17,203.75 in taxable costs.

The university appealed the injunction and the earlier fee award. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the finding concerning unequal athletic participation opportunities but reversed or vacated portions of the treatment-and-benefits injunction, including requirements concerning the university’s tier system, and vacated the fee and cost award. On remand, the district court dissolved the injunction in part because the university had achieved compliance concerning participation opportunities, but reinstated it in part because the university had not shown that its travel and per diem policies provided equitable treatment and benefits.

Parties’ Positions

The plaintiffs argued that they prevailed before trial, at trial, on appeal, and on remand, and that their previously awarded and additional fees and costs were reasonable. They requested $584,141.50 in post-judgment fees and later requested another $36,981.50 for work supporting the renewed fee motion.

The defendants agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to some fees and costs but argued that the earlier award should be reduced because fewer treatment-and-benefits components remained after the appeal. They also argued that the additional fees were excessive, duplicative, irrelevant, unnecessary, or related to unsuccessful work.

Court’s Analysis

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court may allow a prevailing plaintiff a reasonable attorney’s fee in a successful Title IX case. Courts generally calculate a lodestar by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by a reasonable number of hours worked, while excluding hours that were not reasonably spent. A prevailing party is one that succeeds on a significant issue and obtains some of the benefit sought through the litigation.

The court held that the plaintiffs remained prevailing parties because they succeeded on the significant claims concerning athletic participation opportunities and treatment and benefits. The court found that the plaintiffs had obtained excellent results through the permanent injunction, including the reinstated injunction concerning travel and per diem allowances. It declined to reduce the earlier award merely because the plaintiffs did not prevail on every contention.

The court found the requested hourly rates reasonable. It also found that the plaintiffs had adequately reduced their post-judgment request by excluding work concerning contempt motions, unsuccessful opposition to dissolution of the injunction, duplicative work, tiering arguments, and other nonrecoverable work. The court therefore awarded all requested post-appeal fees that remained after those reductions.

The court reduced the additional fee request by $15,218 for work performed before the renewed motion was filed because the plaintiffs had not adequately explained why those fees were first disclosed later and the defendants had not had an opportunity to respond. The court awarded $21,763.50 for the remaining work on the renewed fee motion, bringing the post-judgment fee award to $605,905.00.

For post-judgment costs, the court excluded duplicate pre-appeal costs and an Eighth Circuit admission fee for an attorney who did not sign the appellate briefs and was later terminated as counsel of record. It awarded $3,106.45 in additional post-judgment costs.

Disposition

The court ordered that the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and costs was granted in part and denied in part. It ordered reinstatement of $1,171,442.90 in previously awarded attorney’s fees and costs, awarded an additional $609,011.45 in attorney’s fees and costs, and ordered disbursement of $17,203.75 in previously tendered taxable costs. The court directed that judgment be entered accordingly.