Richard B. v. Kijakazi

Background

Richard B. sought judicial review of the denial of his application for Social Security disability benefits. After Richard B. moved for summary judgment, the parties jointly requested a remand to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court approved that request and remanded the case.

Richard B. then moved under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for $7,200 in attorney’s fees and $100 in costs for his attorney’s pro hac vice admission. The Commissioner did not oppose the fee request but opposed the request for costs. Richard B. had previously been allowed to proceed without prepaying fees or costs, and attorney David F. Chermol represented him in the case.

Attorney’s Fees

The court granted the request for attorney’s fees. It found that Richard B. was a prevailing party because the sentence-four remand followed a judgment reversing the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. The court also found the request timely and determined that Richard B.’s net worth was below the EAJA’s $2 million limit.

The Commissioner did not argue that the government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances made an award unjust. The court therefore found Richard B. eligible for fees. It also approved counsel’s requested hourly rate of $225, based on an increase in the cost of living shown by the consumer price index, and found 32 hours of work reasonable.

The court awarded $7,200 in EAJA fees payable to Richard B. The payment was subject to any offset for preexisting debts he owed the United States.

Costs

The court denied the request for $100 in pro hac vice admission costs. It explained that the EAJA permits costs listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and that the Eighth Circuit had held that pro hac vice fees qualify as taxable costs under that statute. The court stated that it was bound by that decision, although it questioned whether the decision remained consistent with a later Supreme Court ruling requiring a narrow interpretation of taxable costs.

The court nevertheless concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1), which applies when a person proceeds without prepaying fees or costs, prevents the government from being liable for costs in this case. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to the extent it sought reimbursement of the $100 pro hac vice fee.

Disposition

The order states that Richard B.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs was GRANTED in part. The court awarded $7,200 in EAJA fees and ordered payment within 30 days. The motion was DENIED to the extent it sought $100 in reimbursement for pro hac vice admission.