Kirsten E. v. Kijakazi

Background

Kirsten E. sought review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security’s final decision denying her application for disability insurance benefits. She alleged disability beginning May 20, 2019, based on type 1 diabetes with an eye complication, hypothyroidism, rheumatoid arthritis, Raynaud’s disease, migraine headaches, depression, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, anxiety, panic disorder, and other conditions.

An administrative law judge (ALJ) held a hearing at which Kirsten E., who was represented by an attorney, and a vocational expert testified. The ALJ found several severe impairments but concluded that they did not meet or medically equal an impairment in the Social Security Listing of Impairments. The ALJ determined that Kirsten E. had the residual functional capacity (RFC)—the most she could still do in a work setting—to perform less than a full range of light work, with physical and mental restrictions. Although the ALJ found she could not return to her previous jobs, he found that she could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The Appeals Council denied review.

Issues and analysis

Kirsten E. challenged the ALJ’s evaluation of her mental impairments. She argued that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Dr. John M. Schmitz, who stated that she met the criteria for certain mental-disorder listings and had marked limitations in several areas. She also cited psychological testing showing deficits involving social responsiveness, comfort around others, concentration, and independence. The court held that the ALJ properly found Dr. Schmitz’s opinion unpersuasive because it used an outdated listing and was inconsistent with and unsupported by the record, including medical notes describing Kirsten E. as well-groomed, pleasant, and cooperative and showing improved concentration with medication. The court also noted that the ALJ had considered anxiety and addressed it in the listing and RFC analyses.

The court rejected the argument that the ALJ was required to have a medical expert attend the hearing. It explained that the ALJ had a duty to develop the record fairly and fully, but the applicable guidance allowed an ALJ to request and consider medical-expert evidence rather than requiring such testimony at every hearing.

Kirsten E. also argued that the RFC did not adequately account for her use of gloves for symptoms related to Raynaud’s disease and rheumatoid arthritis, and that it failed to reflect the severity of her depression and anxiety. The court found that the ALJ had considered those conditions and supported the RFC with the record, including mental-status examinations, medical opinions, normal wrist range of motion, and the absence of handling, fingering, or feeling restrictions in the state-agency consultants’ opinions. The court declined to reweigh the evidence.

Finally, Kirsten E. challenged the vocational expert’s testimony. The ALJ had relied on testimony identifying office-helper, cleaner/housekeeper, and clothing-presser jobs. The court assumed that the clothing-presser job might not fit the restriction on occasional exposure to extreme heat, but held that any error did not require a remand because the other two jobs remained unchallenged and together represented 611,000 jobs in the national economy. The court concluded that this evidence supported the finding that Kirsten E. could perform work existing in significant numbers.

Disposition

Judge Foster found that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s decision. The court therefore granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, denied Kirsten E.’s motion for summary judgment, affirmed the Commissioner’s decision, and dismissed Kirsten E.’s complaint with prejudice.