Williams v. BHI Energy I Power Services LLC

Background

Marilyn Williams was employed by BHI Energy I Power Services, LLC, as a Field Administrator Manager at Xcel Energy’s nuclear facility in Monticello, Minnesota. She performed administrative work, including payroll processing for BHI employees at the facility. Xcel selected her for a random drug test, which produced an initial positive result for a marijuana metabolite on July 20, 2020. Williams said she believed the result came from a weight-loss tea advertised as free of tetrahydrocannabinol, or THC.

Xcel placed Williams’s unescorted site access on a 14-day administrative hold and removed her from the property. BHI terminated her employment that same day, before her retest confirmed the positive result. The retest later confirmed THC, and Xcel ultimately denied her access. Williams had separately settled an action against the tea manufacturer, but this case concerned only her termination by BHI.

Williams asserted one claim under Minnesota’s Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act, known as DATWA. She alleged that BHI failed to give her written notice of her right to explain the positive test, terminated her based on an initial unconfirmed positive test, and terminated her without first offering an opportunity to participate in counseling or rehabilitation.

BHI’s preemption motion

BHI moved for summary judgment, arguing that federal law preempted Williams’s DATWA claims. Federal preemption means that federal law displaces or limits state-law requirements. BHI relied on both field preemption, which applies when federal regulation occupies a subject area, and conflict preemption, which applies when state and federal requirements cannot operate together or the state law obstructs federal objectives.

The court rejected BHI’s field-preemption argument. Under the Atomic Energy Act and the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning nuclear regulation, the relevant inquiry depends on the type of activity regulated and, in certain circumstances, whether the state law has a direct and substantial effect on radiological-safety decisions. The court concluded that DATWA is a generally applicable worker-protection law enacted for purposes other than protecting against radiation hazards.

The court also concluded that applying DATWA to BHI would not have a direct and substantial effect on Xcel’s radiological-safety decisions. Xcel maintained its own federally compliant fitness-for-duty program and independently controlled access to its nuclear facility. The federal regulations applied to certain contractors only when they implemented fitness-for-duty programs or program elements on which a nuclear licensee relied. The undisputed evidence showed that Xcel did not rely on a BHI fitness-for-duty program, BHI did not have such a program in its nuclear division, and BHI was not an approved fitness-for-duty contractor. BHI’s contractual agreement to follow Xcel’s program did not expand the federal regulations’ scope.

The court likewise rejected conflict preemption. BHI was not directly subject to the federal fitness-for-duty regulations, so it was not legally required to comply with conflicting state and federal requirements. Even assuming the federal rules applied to BHI, the court found that the requirements could be followed together. Federal law allowed Xcel to place Williams’s site access on a temporary hold after an initial positive marijuana test, while DATWA allowed a temporary suspension when reasonably necessary to protect health or safety. After a confirmed first positive test, federal law required termination of site access for at least 14 days, while DATWA required an opportunity for rehabilitation before termination of employment. Those requirements were not irreconcilable.

Williams’s partial summary-judgment motion

Williams sought partial summary judgment on BHI’s liability, leaving damages for trial. The parties disputed whether BHI fired her under a zero-tolerance drug policy or because she could no longer maintain unescorted access to Xcel’s facility. The court found that dispute genuine but not material to liability.

The court held that BHI undisputedly failed to provide written notice of Williams’s right to explain the positive test, violating DATWA subdivision 6. The court further held that, under either stated explanation for the termination, BHI’s action depended on the initial positive test: the loss of Xcel access flowed directly from that test. BHI therefore violated DATWA subdivision 10(a) by terminating Williams based on an initial unconfirmed positive test and subdivision 10(b) by terminating her without first giving her an opportunity to participate in a rehabilitation program.

Order and effect

Judge Katherine M. Menendez denied BHI’s Motion for Summary Judgment, holding that Williams’s DATWA claims against BHI were not preempted by federal law. The court granted Williams’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and found BHI liable for violating subdivisions 6, 10(a), and 10(b) of Minnesota Statute section 181.953. The order states that damages will proceed to trial.